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CONSTITUTIONAL WISH GRANTING AND 
THE PROPERTY RIGHTS GENIE 
Alan E. Brownstein* 
For decades the property rights child has expressed the same 
wish each night at bedtime: 
Star Light, Star Bright 
The Very First Star I See Tonight. 
I Wish The Court May, 
I Wish The Court Might, 
Treat Property Like Other Rights.l 
Finally, in Dolan v. City of Tigard,z a recent Takings Clause 
case, Chief Justice Rehnquist seemed to suggest that the long 
sought after wish was about to be granted. In rejecting Justice 
Stevens' dissenting argument that business regulations deserved 
"a strong presumption of constitutional validity,"3 the Court 
cited decisions invalidating warrantless searches of business 
property and striking down restrictions on commercial speech.4 
Rehnquist then proclaimed in unequivocal terms, "We see no 
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. B.A. 1969, Antioch College; 
J.D. 1977, Harvard University. The author wishes to thank Vtkram Amar and Holly 
Doremus for reading drafts of this article and providing helpful criticism. Thanks also to 
David Moriarty and Stephanie Hamilton for their work as research assistants on this 
project. 
1. See generally Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Emi-
nent Domain (Harvard U. Press, 1985); Bernard H. Siegan, Economic Liberties and the 
Constitution (U. of Chicago Press, 1980); F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty (U. 
of Chicago Press, 1979); Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (U. of Chicago Press, 
1962); Allison Dunham, Griggs v. Alleghany County in Perspective: Thirty Years of 
Supreme Coun Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. a. Rev. 63. For a contrary perspective, see 
C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 741 (1986). 
For the purposes of this article, I assume the common convention that a distinction 
exists between property rights under the Takings Clause and personal liberty interests 
such as freedom of speech, notwithstanding the occasional judicial comment that "(t]he 
right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or 
the right to travel, is in truth a 'personal' right." Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 
u.s. 538, 552 (1972). 
2. 114 s. a. 2309 (1994). 
3. Id. at 2325 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
4. Id. at 2320 (citing Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) and Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980)). 
7 
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reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much 
a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth 
Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation 
in these comparable circumstances."s 
As any reader of fairy tales can report, however, asking 
powerful entities like genies or supreme court justices to grant 
one's wishes can be a precarious undertaking. The wish maker is 
often likely to end up with sausages on their spouse's nose or 
suffering some other unanticipated calamity.6 The same fate can 
easily befall lawyers and judges who think that the doctrinal grass 
is always greener in the cases protecting some other right than 
the one they are asserting and, accordingly, demand equal treat-
ment. Instead of doing the hard work of explaining the unique 
purposes that justify the protection of an interest as a right in 
particular circumstances, such jurists insist that an interest, such 
as property, deserves the same form or level of constitutional 
protection afforded some other distinct interest because both in-
terests are "rights." 
The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate the intellectual 
bankruptcy of this kind of constitutional reasoning as it applies to 
property rights and the Takings Clause. Taking property rights 
proponents at their word, I analogize property to other constitu-
tionally recognized interests to suggest just how much currently 
provided protection property rights might lose if they were 
treated comparably to other enumerated and non-enumerated 
rights. I conclude that the only appropriate way to protect prop-
erty for constitutional purposes is to examine this right indepen-
dently of other rights and to develop a suitable jurisprudence of 
property rights that is grounded on the nature of property as an 
interest, not in terms of its poor or rich relation to other rights. 
S. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320. Justice Rehnquist's statement in Dolan was more than 
mere rhetoric. He raised the issue of the relationship between property and personal 
liberty rights in part to justify the Court's adoption of unconstitutional condition princi-
ples, a doctrine that originated in personal liberty rights cases, not in a Takings Clause 
decision. ld. at 2316-17. 
6. See Charles Perrault, The Foolish Wishes, reprinted in Beauties, Beasts and En-
chantment, Classic French Fairy Tales 64 (Jack Zipes, trans., New American Library, 
1989). This classic fairy tale tells the story of a poor woodcutter who is granted the first 
three wishes he makes. He uses his first wish carelessly when he wishes he had sausages 
with his wine. His wife, enraged at his foolish wish, berates him for his carelessness. Her 
chastising so angers the woodcutter that he wishes the sausages were hanging from her 
nose. When this inadvertent wish is also literally carried out, the unfortunate woodcutter 
must use his final wish to get the sausage off of his wife's nose. 
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I. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AND STATE ACTION . 
Regardless of the substantive content of a right or the pur-
ported rigor of the review provided to laws that arguably abridge 
the right, no constitutional issue arises unless the threshold of 
state action is passed.7 Both the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and takings principles incorporated into the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are governed by 
this basic limitation of the Constitution's coverage. Private indi-
viduals do not "take" property for constitutional purposes any-
more than private individuals "abridge" freedom of speech. 
Only the state can violate the Constitution by impairing rights. 
Over the last two decades, however, the Court has systemat-
ically restricted the scope of state action by narrowly construing 
or distinguishing earlier Warren Court precedents In doing so, it 
has implicitly insisted that state action principles must be applied 
consistently and mechanically-regardless of the underlying con-
stitutional cause of action that is at issue.9 Thus, if the Takings 
Clause deserves an equal seat in the pantheon of rights, one must 
necessarily conclude that Takings claims are limited by the same 
state action requirements that are applied to other, supposedly 
more favored rights. 
One important state action case is Flagg Brothers, Inc., v. 
Brooks.w In Flagg Brothers, plaintiff challenged the actions of a 
warehouseman who proposed to sell the goods that he had been 
storing for her on the grounds that she was in default on her stor-
age bill. Plaintiff argued that the sale of her belongings without a 
hearing and prior judicial determination that she was in default 
for the alleged amount owed constituted a deprivation of her 
7. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (noting 
the "essential dichotomy" in the Fourteenth Amendment between state action which is 
subject to constitutional scrutiny and private conduct, " 'however discriminatory or 
wrongful,' against which the Fourteenth Amendment offers no shield"). 
8. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 892-95, 915, 920 (The Foundation 
Press, Inc., 12th ed. 1991) (noting that in contrast to judicial decisions during the 1960's, 
the modem Court has refused to extend public function doctrine, has rejected statements 
in earlier cases that state authorization or encouragement of private conduct may consti-
tute state action, and has generally acted to "circumscribe the scope of the state action 
concept"); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 365-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for 
taking "a major step in repudiating" past precedent in its failure to find that conduct of 
state sanctioned, heavily regulated, public utility monopoly constitutes state action). 
9. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Emerging Threshold Approach to State Ac-
tion Determinations: Trying to Make Sense of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 69 Geo. L.J. 
745, 766-67 (1981} (arguing that the Court's cases preclude a balancing approach to state 
action issue or an analysis under which the state action threshold may vary when different 
constitutional rights are asserted). 
10. 436 u.s. 149 (1978). 
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property without due process of law.n The warehouseman's con-
duct was "attributable" to the state because he was acting pursu-
ant to a New York statute that explicitly authorized the sale of a 
debtor's property in circumstances of this kind.12 
The Supreme Court dismissed plaintiff's suit. The majority 
opinion written by Justice Rehnquist held that commercial dis-
pute resolution arrangements are not the exclusive prerogative of 
the government. Therefore, plaintiff could not establish state ac-
tion by asserting that the warehouseman was engaged in a public 
function as were, for example, the Democratic Party's officials in 
the white primary cases.13 More importantly, the Court also 
found that the state's statutory authorization of the sale of a de-
faulting debtor's goods did not constitute state action because 
the state merely permitted the warehouseman to take such an 
action. Since the state did not require the warehouseman to sell 
plaintiff's belongings, the governmental compulsion necessary to 
transform private decisions and conduct into state action was 
lacking in this case.14 
From the Court's perspective, all that New York had accom-
plished through the adoption of its warehouseman lien statute 
was to deny judicial relief to debtors who protested a warehouse-
man's sale of their stored goods. The state's refusal to provide a 
remedy for plaintiff's alleged injury no more constituted state ac-
tion in causing plaintiff's injury than would the state's enforce-
ment of a statute of limitations that deprived a person of redress 
because they had delayed too long in filing suit.ts Thus, Justice 
Rehnquist wrote, 
If the mere denial of judicial relief is considered sufficient en-
couragement to make the State responsible for those private 
acts, all private deprivations of property would be converted 
into public acts whenever the State, for whatever reason, de-
nies relief sought by the putative property owner. . . . Here, 
the State of New York has not compelled the sale of a bailor's 
goods, but has merely announced the circumstances under 
which its courts will not interfere with a private sale. Indeed, 
the crux of respondent's complaint is not that the State has 
acted, but that it has refused to act,16 
11. Id. at 153. 
12. Id. at 151 n.l. 
13. Id. at 158. 
14. Id. at 165. 
15. Id. at 166. 
16. Id. at 165-66. 
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If property rights under the Takings Clause are equivalent to 
other constitutionally protected interests, they should be gov-
erned by the same state action requirements that limit procedural 
due process guarantees. The holding of Flagg Brothers-that the 
withdrawal of state remedies for the consequences of private 
conduct, permitted but not compelled by state statute, does not 
constitute state action-should be fully applicable to Takings 
Clause claims. Treating due process and substantive property 
rights equally under state action doctrine, however, risks signifi-
cantly undermining recent Takings Clause decisions. 
Consider how state action doctrine might affect the Court's 
decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,11 the case 
on which the Court's analysis in Dolan is grounded.ls Nollan in-
volved a challenge to the kind of land use dealmaking that is cur-
rently employed by many states and communities as an 
alternative to the direct regulation of property development. 
Under a dealmaking approach, the owner of land who is seeking 
to develop her property must meet certain pre-conditions before 
a development proposal will be approved. Typically, these pre-
conditions involve the transfer of property interests the state 
could not obtain through direct regulation because of Takings 
Clause constraints.19 
Thus, in Nollan, the California Coastal Commission wanted 
property owners to allow the public physical access across their 
beachfront so that people might be able to walk from one public 
beach to another.2o A Commission regulation imposing a public 
easement over the land would constitute a permanent physical 
invasion of the property, however, and as such, it would violate 
the Takings Clause unless just compensation was paid to the 
owner.21 When the property owners sought the requisite ap-
proval of their plans to construct a three bedroom house on their 
property, the Commission conditioned its granting of permission 
to construct the house on the owners' transfer of the sought after 
17. 483 u.s. 825 (1987). 
18. In Nollan the Court held that in order for government to demand an uncompen-
sated public easement over plaintiffs' land as a condition to granting plaintiffs a permit for 
the development of their property, the state must demonstrate an "essential nexus" be-
tween the ends advanced by its regulation and the proposed use of plaintiffs' land. I d. at 
836. In Dolan, the Court extended this "essential nexus" standard and adopted a "rough 
proportionality" requirement. After Dolan, then, the government must show not only 
that the regulation is substantially related to a legitimate state goal, but that the impact 
upon the proposed development is roughly proportional "both in nature and extent" to 
the state's legitimate regulatory objectives. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319. 
19. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831. 
20. ld. at 828. 
21. ld. at 831. 
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easement to the public. Pursuant to this "deal," the Commission 
argued, the Takings Clause was effectively circumvented because 
the owner had voluntarily given the state the easement it desired. 
Thus, the easement could be obtained without paying the owner 
compensation.22 
The Court's decision in Nollan limited this dealmaking 
model to those situations in which an "essential nexus" exists be-
tween the condition the state imposes on the land owner and 
some burden or externality created by the owner's development 
proposal that the state may legitimately seek to mitigate or off-
set.23 In the case before it, the house the owners sought to con-
struct did not interfere with any state interest that would be 
advanced by providing the public access across their beachfront. 
Without that connection, the state's conditioning of its permis-
sion to construct a house on the granting of the requested ease-
ment was not a legitimate regulatory response to the external 
costs the owner's proposed construction project would impose on 
the public. Instead, it was little more than extortion backed by 
the state's authority to deny development proposals at its 
discretion.24 
Nollan was an important constitutional victory for property 
owners, but it is important to understand the legal predicate on 
which the decision is based. The state only uses dealmaking in-
stead of direct regulation in those circumstances when it cannot 
achieve its goals through regulation alone. If the state could ar-
range for public access across an owner's beachfront property di-
rectly without obtaining the owner's consent to that intrusion 
beforehand, the state would not have to make a deal with the 
owner in the first place, and the substance of the Nollan decision 
would be irrelevant and all but useless to many property owners. 
The state action doctrine of Flagg Brothers allows a state to 
achieve the very result condemned in Nollan without paying one 
cent of compensation to property owners impacted by its action. 
All the state needs to do is to pass a law permitting, but not com-
pelling, members of the public to cross any private beachfront 
property that separates public lands without fear of legal sanc-
tion. As in Flagg Brothers, the state would be denying judicial 
relief to individuals suffering a private injury. In essence, the 
remedy for trespass would be eliminated in certain specified cir-
cumstances, but no agent of the state would set foot on anyone's 
22. Id. at 828-29. 
23. Id. at 837. 
24. Id. 
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private property. The state would simply be refusing to act to 
protect property against private infringement. Since the refusal 
to protect property against private intrusions under Flagg Broth-
ers would not constitute state action, property owners could not 
assert a takings claim against the governmental entity that au-
thorized the invasion of their land. 
One might argue, of course, that substantive property rights 
are different than procedural due process rights and that it makes 
very little sense to subject such distinct interests to the same for-
mal state action doctrine.zs That is a fair response (even though 
25. The dissonance between the interpretation of state action for Takings Clause 
purposes and the way that state action doctrine is applied when other rights are at issue is 
not limited to procedural due process cases. While a discussion of Flagg Brothers and 
Nollan clearly illustrates the uniquely "liberal" understanding of state action in takings 
cases, other comparisons demonstrate the same point with equal force. When freedom of 
speech claims are asserted, for example, the Court insists that despite its "special solici-
tude for the guarantees of the First Amendment," Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 
551, 568 (1972), "it must be remembered that the First and Fourteenth Amendments safe-
guard the rights of free speech and assembly by limitations on state action, not on action 
by the owner of private property used nondiscriminately for private purposes only." I d. at 
567. 
Thus, when labor union members picketing on the grounds of a privately owned 
shopping center protested that the owners' threat to have them arrested for trespass 
would violate their First Amendment rights, the Court rejected their contention, not on 
the merits, but because "the constitutional guarantee of free expression has no part to 
play in a case such as this." Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1975}. Since the shop-
ping centers owners were acting as private proprietors, not as agents of the state, the First 
Amendment provided no protection to speakers seeking access to their property. As the 
Court explained, "while statutory or common law may in some situations extend protec-
tion or provide redress against a private corporation or person who seeks to abridge the 
free expression of others, no such protection or redress is provided by the Constitution 
itself." Id. at 513. 
In a constitutional regime providing parity among rights, one would assume that if 
there is no state action when a property owner, exercising his personal discretion, invokes 
state law to prevent a speaker from engaging in expressive activity on his property, there 
is also no state action if the state shifts its legal standard to protect the speech interests of 
the speaker rather than the property prerogatives of the owner. If a speaker, exercising 
his own discretion, invokes state Jaw to provide him access to shopping center property 
for the purposes of engaging in expressive activity, an evenhanded application of state 
action standards would preclude the owner from asserting a Takings Clause claim based 
on this private invasion of his property. In both cases the state is merely permitting pri-
vate conduct that interferes with constitutionally protected interests. In the former con-
text, the property owner is allowed to silence the speaker and, in the latter context, the 
speaker is allowed to invade the owner's property. In this conflict between private speech 
and private property, state action should be equally absent regardless of the interest the 
state elects to protect against private abridgment. 
But state action doctrine does not operate in this evenhanded way. When the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held as a matter of state constitutional law in Robins v. Pruneyard 
Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), that speakers 
have the right to engage in expressive activity in private shopping centers, the shopping 
center owners' claim that such state authorized, but not compelled, invasions constituted 
a taking of their property was reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. Under the 
precedent of Lloyd Corp. and Hudgens, the owners' claim should have been dismissed 
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the Supreme Court does not purport to recognize it as such),26 
but it is largely irrelevant to our analysis. What this state action 
example illustrates is that property may not be such a "poor rela-
tion" to other rights after all and that property rights proponents 
should be grateful that property, at least on some occasions, is 
treated differently than protected liberty interests.27 Indeed, this 
example also begins to demonstrate that demands based on the 
alleged greater protection provided to some rights in comparison 
to others may be a superficial and unhelpful way to talk about 
the level of protection that particular rights should receive. 
II. DEFINING TAKINGS - THE PROBLEM OF 
PURPOSE AND EFFECT 
Rights are defined in significant part by the Court's determi-
nation of what constitutes an infringement of the right.zs In re-
cent years, the Court has substantially reduced the protection 
provided to important personal liberty rights by insisting that 
certain rights are only abridged for constitutional purposes by 
deliberate governmental decisions intended to impermissibly 
burden the exercise of the right. The most dramatic and contro-
versial example of this approach to defining rights is the trun-
cated interpretation given the Free Exercise Clause in 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Ore-
gon v. Smith.29 
Prior to the Court's decision in Smith, a religious individual 
could bring a free exercise claim against the state if the law at 
issue had the effect of interfering with the practitioner's ability to 
exercise her faith. Thus, the State of Wisconsin did not adopt 
compulsory education laws for high school students for the pur-
because of a lack of state action. Instead, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 
U.S. 74 (1980), the Court decided the case on the merits and ruled that the pennitted 
invasions were not sufficiently intrusive to establish a taking. ld. at 88. Despite the obvi-
ous fact that the lack of state action had been the controlling factor in those cases in 
which the state had favored property over speech, the Court in Pruneyard did not even 
address the question of state action in resolving petitioner's takings claims. As with pro-
cedural due process, state action parameters may limit free speech rights but are tem-
pered or ignored when takings claims are asserted. 
26. See Alan E. Brownstein and Stephen M. Hankins, Pruning Pruneyard: Limiting 
Free Speech Rights Under Stale Constitutions on the Property of Privale Medical Clinics 
Providing Abortion Services, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1073, 1093-1105 (1991) (criticizing the 
Court's formalistic approach to state action and its failure to adequately explain decisions 
that deviate from this standard). 
27. For the purpose of this comparative analysis, I argue that procedural due process 
rights should be understood to be a "liberty" right, see infra note 89. 
28. See Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden 
Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 Hastings LJ. 867 (1994). 
29. 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
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pose of destroying the Amish community's ability to maintain 
their religious traditions, but the incidental impact of those laws 
were sufficiently burdensome to the Amish faith to justify a con-
stitutionally mandated religious exemption from their applica-
tion.3o Smith transformed free exercise jurisprudence by holding 
that only laws that are purposefully directed at supressing a reli-
gious faith violate free exercise guarantees.31 
Under this new constitutional regime, laws prohibiting the 
ingestion of drugs and alcoholic beverages might make it impos-
sible for Jews to drink wine at the Passover seder, for Catholic 
priests to offer parishioners wine in the communion service, and 
for members of certain Native American faiths to use peyote as 
part of their religious rituals. Free exercise claims for religious 
exemptions would be dismissed in all of these situations despite 
the debilitating impact of these prohibitory laws on religious 
30. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Smith, the Court explained that 
Yoder had involved a "hybrid situation" where plaintiffs' free exercise claim was inextri-
cably intertwined with their rights as parents. Because Smith involved "a free exercise 
claim unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right," the Court found it 
easily distinguishable from Yoder. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 
31. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. The analytical framework governing free exercise cases 
that the Court proposes in Smith focuses primarily on two kinds of laws, neutral laws of 
general applicability that incidentally interfere with religious practice and laws that pro-
hibit acts "only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the 
religious belief that they display." ld. at 877. According to the majority in Smith, the 
former laws fall outside of the protection provided by the Free Exercise Clause. The 
latter laws violate free exercise rights unless they can be justified under strict scrutiny. ld. 
at 885-90. 
While the Court commits considerable effort to the task of explaining why neutral 
laws of general applicability should not be held to violate the Free Exercise Clause, it says 
almost nothing in the Smith opinion about why laws that prohibit acts "only when they 
are engaged in for religious reasons" are unconstitutional. Presumably, the Court be-
lieved that the constitutional impropriety of such laws was self-evident and required little 
justification. In any event, the Court does not state explicitly that it is distinguishing be-
tween laws that only incidentally affect religious practitioners and are, therefore, constitu-
tional and laws that are purposefully directed at punishing or suppressing religious beliefs 
and are, therefore, invalid. 
Despite the lack of any explicit description distinguishing laws that merely effect reli-
gious practices from those that are purposefully directed at religious activities, it should 
be clear that the Smith decision rests on just such a purpose and effect dichotomy. What 
makes a law directed exclusively at a religious practice constitutionally offensive, after all, 
is the fact that the law can have no purpose other than the suppression of the religion 
motivating the proscribed activity. The more general law that applies to an activity re-
gardless of whether it is engaged in for religious or secular reasons is as burdensome to 
the religious practitioner as the narrow, discriminatory law. What makes the general law 
ostensibly more benign is that its effect on religious practice appears to be incidental and 
unintended rather than an act of deliberate hostility. See Brownstein, 45 Hastings L.J. at 
933-35 (cited in note 28). 
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practices. Only the rare law that intentionally singled out one of 
these religious practices for suppression would be struck down.3z 
In a constitutional system that treats property rights as no 
more or less important than religious freedom, a similar restric-
tion on the scope of the Takings Clause might be appropriate. 
That conclusion, however, would transform and significantly re-
duce the constitutional protection provided to private property. 
Pursuant to current doctrine, in almost all cases judges determine 
whether a "taking" has occurred by examining the effect of the 
challenged state action and almost nothing else. Thus, a law that 
has the effect of denying property owners any economically via-
ble use of their land constitutes an unconstitutional taking, 
whether the legislative body adopting the law intended to bring 
about that result or not. The state need not deliberately single 
out particular property for the purpose of rendering it valueless 
for a taking to occur.33 
Indeed, even very liberal Justices on the Supreme Court 
have made it clear that any attempt to restrict the scope of the 
Takings Clause to the deliberately intended confiscation of prop-
erty rights is unacceptable. Justice Brennan, for example, argued 
that those who challenge the very idea of a regulatory taking 
implicitly posit the distinction that the government intends to 
take property through condemnation or physical invasion 
whereas it does not through police power regulations ... But 
'the Constitution measures a taking of property not by what a 
State says, or by what it intends, but by what it does.' ... It is 
only logical, then, that government action other than acquisi-
tion of title, occupancy, or physical invasion can be a 'taking,' 
... where the effects completely deprive the owner of all or 
most of his interest in the property .34 
Brennan's refutation of the contention that regulations can-
not take property because they are not intended to acquire the 
title of land or to physically occupy it is stated abstractly to estab-
lish the basic concept of a regulatory taking. The issue of legisla-
32. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 
2217 (1993) (holding that ordinance prohibiting ritual animal sacrifice was not of general 
applicability and thus impermissibly violated the Free Exercise Clause). 
33. See infra note 37. 
34. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652-53 (1981) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290,298 (1967) (Stew-
art, J., concurring) ("As is so often the case when a State exercises its power to make law, 
or to regulate, or to pursue a public project, pre-existing property interests were impaired 
here without any calculated decision to deprive anyone of what he once owned. But the 
Constitution measures a taking of property not by what a State says, or by what it intends, 
but by what it does."). 
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tive purpose creates additional, more specific problems for 
takings claims, however, even if one accepts Brennan's argument 
that regulatory takings exist and are prohibited by the Constitu-
tion. In the context of a specific case, if only purposeful viola-
tions of fundamental rights are actionable, can a city be held 
liable for adopting a regulation that has the incidental effect of 
denying property owners any economically viable use of their 
land while trying to further a benign and clearly legitimate regu-
latory purpose? 
The facts alleged in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo 
County3s demonstrate the risk to property rights that an analogy 
between the Takings Clause and the Free Exercise Clause would 
entail. In MacDonald, petitioners owned 44 acres of unimproved 
land adjacent to the city of Davis, California which they hoped to 
subdivide and develop for residential housing. Petitioners' de-
velopment plans were blocked, however, by local city and county 
decisions to preserve the subject property for agricultural uses. 
While much of the area surrounding Davis was restricted to and 
used for agricultural purposes, petitioners argued that their land 
could not be profitably utilized for farming. Under threat of con-
demnation, the topsoil on their parcel had been stripped away 
and used on nearby highway construction. Moreover, the re-
maining soil was infested with pests, and the property's proximity 
to nearby housing precluded the economically efficient use of 
pesticides to control this problem. Thus, petitioners claimed that 
the only use of their property they retained was "the 'right' to 
farm the Property at a loss."36 
Petitioners' predicament in MacDonald may be uncommon, 
but it is hardly unique. General land use regulations that on 
their face allow property an economically viable use, but have 
the incidental effect of rendering certain parcels of land all but 
valueless, do not deliberately single out particular property for 
disadvantageous treatment.37 They have the same relationship 
35. 477 u.s. 340 (1986). 
36. Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, id. 
37. Some land use regulations, of course, might be successfully challenged on the 
grounds that they deliberately single out particular parcels and deprive them of any rea-
sonable beneficial use. The effect of an ordinance requiring that land be left vacant to 
preserve "open space" in a community can hardly be described as an incidental conse-
quence of regulation. In other circumstances, however, the owners are deprived of any 
reasonable beneficial use of their property because the unique characteristics of particular 
parcels of land make them unsuitable for the normally profitable uses permitted by appli-
cable regulations. In Annicel/i v. Town of South Kingstown, 463 A.2d 133 (R.I. 1983), for 
example, plaintiff's lot was zoned HFD (High Flood Danger) a short time after she 
purchased it. An HFD designation permitted several potentially profitable land uses in-
cluding agriculture, commercial storage, and various recreational enterprises. The Rhode 
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between purpose and effect as a neutral law of general applicabil-
ity that has the incidental impact of preventing religious individu-
als from practicing their faith. As such, if the protection 
provided property rights by the Takings Clause is reinterpreted 
to conform to the reasoning of the Smith case, property owners 
in circumstances similar to those alleged in MacDonald could no 
more raise a claim for just compensation for their losses than the 
Island Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff's property was "taken" because the size, 
location, and typography of her parcel rendered all of these uses impractical. I d. at 136, 
141. 
Similarly, in City of Evansville v. Reis Tire Sales, Inc., 333 N.E.2d 800 (Ind. App. 
1975), the enforcement of a single family residential zoning ordinance against a property 
owner was held to constitute a taking because the nature of the terrain in plaintiff's parcel 
(a large ravine ran through it) would cause construction costs to be so high that single 
family housing could not be developed profitably on the property. Id. at 802. See also 
Fallini v. Hodel, 725 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Nev. 1989), aff'd, 963 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that the Bureau of Land Management's cancellation of ground water site im-
provement permits constituted a taking under Fifth Amendment when cancellation in-
creased wild horses' access to water); City of Anderson v. Associated Furniture & 
Appliances, Inc., 423 N.E.2d 293 (Ind. 1981) (holding that denial of petition for amend-
ment of zoning ordinance to commercial use constituted an unlawful taking when only 
reasonable use of land was commercial). 
The fact that the burden on property owners in these cases were incidental conse-
quences of facially legitimate land use regulations did not preclude judicial determina-
tions that a taking of property had occurred. 
Commonly, in cases of this kind, property owners will seek a variance or rezoning 
before they file suit. The denial of their petition for relief from unexpectedly onerous 
regulations by itself does not suggest as a constitutional matter that the city's actions were 
purposeful rather than incidental as to their impact on the subject property. There is 
nothing in the reasoning in Smith indicating that the legislature's refusal to grant an ex-
emption from a law of general applicability to a religious group transforms the nature of 
the challenged law from a neutral rule to a discriminatory one. 
It may be argued, however, that plaintiffs' showing of a pattern by the city of granting 
variances in similar situations alters the constitutional analysis. In Smith the Supreme 
Court distinguished Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), a case upholding a sabba-
tarian's right to receive unemployment compensation despite her refusal to work on her 
sabbath on free exercise grounds, because the unemployment commission denying plain-
tiff's benefits determined eligibility for compensation through a system of individualized 
assessments and exemptions. Under an analogous rational, a city that regularly granted 
variances from single family residential zoning requirements to owners seeking to develop 
their property for commercial uses might not be able to avoid constitutional scrutiny of 
their decisions by pointing to the general applicability of the underlying zoning require-
ments. See, e.g., Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Marion County v. Sheehan Con-
struction Co., 313 N.E.2d 78 (Ind. App. 1974) (explaining that the city's granting of 
numerous variances for commercial uses in area zoned for residential housing contributed 
to court's conclusion that restricting plaintiffs to residential uses denied them any reason-
able beneficial use of their property). 
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Native Americans in Smith could invoke the Free Exercise 
Clause to protect their right to practice their religion.3s 
38. In an interesting, but ambiguous, exchange between Justice Stevens, in dissent, 
and Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), the relationship between takings doctrine and the Court's 
reasoning in Employment Division v. Smith is discussed at some length. Stevens criticizes 
the majority's conclusion that the Beachfront Management Act restricting the develop-
ment of the petitioner's lots in Lucas constituted a taking because of the generality of the 
challenged statute and the large number of property owners affected by it. If a primary 
purpose of the Takings Clause is to prevent a small group of property owners from being 
forced to bear the costs of government that should be borne in fairness by the public as a 
whole, Stevens argues, a law that burdens a sufficiently large and general class of property 
owners cannot be a taking because the very breadth of its coverage insures that the costs 
it imposes are spread widely. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2924 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Stevens' basic argument about the generality of property regulations makes a valid 
and useful point. Certainly one of the reasons why taxes (which clearly take property in 
the form of currency from owners) are not routinely condemned as takings is the general-
ity inherent in most tax statutes. Unfortunately, Stevens confuses this issue by referring 
to the Smith case as an example of the Court's concern about the need for generality in 
legislation. Id. at 2923 n.7. While both takings cases and Smith recognize the importance 
of the generality of legislation, they do so for different reasons. For takings purposes, the 
lack of generality of a law raises concerns about the law's effect. The critical issue is 
whether the impact of the law is being fairly allocated among those who benefit from it. 
For free exercise purposes, the lack of generality of a law that singles out the practices of 
a particular faith for suppression is problematic, not because of concerns about the law's 
effect (the law will often have a disproportionate impact on religious practitioners 
whether the law applies to non-believers or not), but rather because of suspicions about 
the law's purpose. It is difficult to imagine a non-invidious motive for a law that prohibits 
a practice only when it is preformed for religious purposes by the practitioners of a partic-
ular faith. See supra note 32. 
Justice Scalia's response to Stevens' criticism is equally problematic, however. First, 
Scalia completely ignores the contention that a general law that spreads burdens fairly 
among a large group of property owners cannot constitute a taking because, by definition, 
it does not single out any person or group for unjustly disproportionate burdens. Second, 
Scalia seems to suggest that current takings doctrine is completely consistent with the 
reasoning of Smith. The correct "takings" analogy to a facially neutral law of general 
applicability that incidentally interferes with the practice of a religion, to Scalia, would be 
"a law that destroys the value of land without being aimed at land." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 
2899 n.14. That kind of a generally applicable law might not constitute a taking, but any 
"regulation specifically directed to land use no more acquires immunity by plundering 
landowners generally than does a law specifically directed at religious practice acquire 
immunity by prohibiting all religions." I d. 
It is hard to know what to make of this analysis or even to take it seriously. While the 
rationale for the Court's decision in Smith may be criticized because it overstates the 
problems inherent in subjective, value based balancing and understates the needs of reli-
gious minorities for constitutional protection against unintended interferences with their 
religious practices, the majority's concerns in Smith were at least intelligible. What possi-
ble rationale exists for distinguishing between laws directed at property and those that 
incidentally burden its use? 
Moreover, Justice Scalia's argument distorts the meaning of the Takings Clause in 
several significant ways. The Takings Clause protects property, not simply land, against 
both physical and regulatory takings. Thus, Scalia's emphasis on real property in Lucas 
strangely narrows the scope of what the Takings Clause protects. See generally Rorida 
Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1572 n.32 (Fed. Cir. 1994), (describing 
range of property interests that Takings Clause protects). Conversely, however, Scalia's 
analysis also extends the scope of the Takings Clause beyond recognition. The Takings 
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An interpretation of the Takings Clause that limited its ap-
plication to the intended consequences of state action, leaving all 
incidental impacts on property without constitutional remedy, 
would not only restrict the availability of regulatory taking 
claims. It would also preclude suits for just compensation based 
on incidental or unintended physical invasions or injuries. In the 
landmark case of Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company,39 for exam-
Clause has never been understood to protect the free use of property the way that the 
Free Exercise Clause protects the practice of religion. See, e.g., Bowles v. United States, 
31 Fed. Cl. 37, 53 (1994) (noting that "the takings clause is not designed to limit govern-
mental interference with property rights per se"). Instead, the clause prohibits a certain 
kind of government interference with property, state action that physically occupies or 
destroys property or, what represents the regulatory equivalent of an occupation, render-
ing property completely useless to its owner. A law that generally regulates most prop-
erty, but incidentally destroys the value of certain parcels, is not directed to the taking of 
property. 
Scalia's argument also seems to distort the very focus of the Takings Clause. It is not 
the institution or the physical embodiment of property that is protected by the Takings 
Clause. The clause protects the owners' interest in their property, the owners' distinct 
investment-backed expectations. Any law regulating the use of property that applies with 
equal force to owners and third parties who lack title or an investment-backed interest in 
the regulated goods is a law of general applicability for takings purposes since it governs 
those individuals whose interests are constitutionally recognized under the Takings 
Clause and those individuals whose uses of property would not be protected. A potential 
adverse possessor, ignored by the owner, would be prevented from constructing a beach-
front house in South Carolina along with Mr. Lucas despite the fact that the possessor 
had no constitutionally protected interest in the land subject to regulation. 
Finally, one can only wonder whether Justice Scalia, or any of the other Justices join-
ing the majority opinion in Lucas, are truly prepared to allow the holding of Lucas to be 
circumvented by the enactment of laws that are not specifically directed at the use of land 
by property owners. Laws directed at avoiding environmental consequences, for exam-
ple, such as regulations prohibiting all acts that adversely impact or harm an endangered 
species, or interfere with the availability of wetlands as a roosting area for migrating 
water fowl, or contribute to the erosion of beachfront, are rules of general applicability 
and may govern a variety of forms of behavior having little to do with the productive 
development of real property. See generally Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Commu-
nities for a Great Oregon, 63 U.S.L.W. 4665 (U.S. June 29, 1995) (holding that provision in 
Endangered Species Act using the term "harm" to define prohibition against the taking of 
wildlife applies to significant habitat modification or degradation as well as the direct 
killing of animals through hunting and other means); Ballam v. United States, 806 F.2d 
1017, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that erosion on which plaintiffs grounded their 
takings claim "resulted directly and proximately from the acts of persons navigating ves-
sels up and down the waterway, and generating waves therein"). Thus, if Justice Scalia's 
commitment to the reasoning of Smith, as it is defended in Lucas, is implemented as 
rigorously for regulations that incidentally interfere with the use of land as it is for regula-
tions that incidentally interfere with free exercise rights, the protection provided to prop-
erty rights by the Lucas decision will be significantly undermined. Indeed, the plaintiff in 
Lucas, himself, would have been denied just compensation under this analysis if South 
Carolina had prohibited him from constructing a house on his lot pursuant to a general 
law restricting any acts that cause beachfront erosion. As long as the regulation limited 
the use of boats on neighboring waterways as well as denying owners the use of their land, 
such a law would not be specifically directed at the use of land and, therefore, could not 
constitute a taking under Justice Scalia's reasoning. 
39. 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 166 (1871). 
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pie, plaintiffs' land was flooded and rendered virtually valueless 
after the construction of a dam allegedly authorized by state stat-
ute. The Supreme Court concluded that plaintiffs deserved just 
compensation for their losses despite defendant's protests that 
the complained of effects were remote, consequential, and inci-
dental to the state's legitimate exercise of its police powers to 
control navigable waterways.40 
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Pumpelly, there have 
been a literal legion of cases in which the federal government 
has been held liable for a range of predictable and not so predict-
able consequences of dredging rivers and constructing dams or 
canals.41 In the great majority of cases, the effects on land that 
are held to constitute a taking are obviously incidental to the 
government's objectives in the same sense that the impact of a 
general law on the ability of a minority faith to practice its reli-
gion is incidental to the government's goals in enacting the law. 
The state did not criminalize the use of peyote for the purpose of 
interfering with Native American religious rituals. Similarly, the 
government does not dredge rivers, build canals or construct 
dams for the purpose of eroding the banks of downstream prop-
erty owners, flooding downstream property from water seeping 
under a dam, raising the ground water level in the area surround-
ing canals to inundate the root structure of nearby orchards, 
covering adjacent property with mud, silt, and salt water over-
flow from dredging deposits, or raising the water table and block-
ing drainage to create subterranean floods in local mining 
operations. 42 
40. Id. at 181. 
41. See, e.g., United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950) (con-
struction of government lock and dam pennanently raised water level of river resulting in 
destruction of agricultural land); King v. United States, 427 F2d 767 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (back-
water effects of dam were underestimated by the government and plaintiff's land was 
pennanently flooded); Berenholz v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 620 (1982), aff'd, 723 F.2d 68 
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (government's repair of dike led to flooding and erosion of plaintiff's 
land). 
42. See, e.g., Owen v. United States, 851 F.2d 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (compensable 
taking found where dredging of river resulted in downstream erosion, eventually causing 
plaintiff's house to fall into river); Pashley v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 737, 738 (Q. Cl. 
1957) (taking found where plaintiff's land flooded even though "[e]very effort was made 
[by the government] to make the base of the dam watertight"); L.L. Richord v. United 
States, 282 F.2d 901 (Q. CI. 1960) (where construction and operation of a canal results in 
raised ground water levels, rendering plaintiff's land unsuitable for citrus tree orchard, 
just compensation is due); Fonalledas v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 1019 (Q. Cl. 1952) 
(taking found where dredging of channel in a harbor resulted in plaintiff's land being 
buried under mud and silt); Tri-State Materials Corp. v. United States, 550 F.2d 1 (Ct. CI. 
1977) (taking found where dam caused rise in water table which impaired ease and profit-
ability of plaintiff's gravel extracting business). 
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Nonetheless, the government is held liable for these and all 
other "natural and probable consequences" of its activities that 
permanently destroy the utility of property. As the Supreme 
Court explained in holding that the inevitable, but obviously un-
desired, erosion of property resulting from the construction of a 
dam constituted a taking, "If the Government cannot take the 
acreage it wants without also washing away more, that more be-
comes part of the taking."43 
Under an interpretation of the Takings Clause requiring the 
deliberate destruction of property as the predicate for receiving 
just compensation, Pumpelly and a host of other physical inva-
sion or injury cases might well be decided in favor of the govern-
ment defendants. It is difficult to understand why the incidental 
flooding and destruction of the use value of property adjacent to 
a dammed waterway should be distinguished from the construc-
tion of a public improvement that incidentally makes it impossi-
ble for the members of a religion to practice their faith by 
destroying sacred sites used for worship. If property rights re-
ceive the same protection provided to religious liberty, the eco-
nomic use of land should receive no greater protection than the 
religious use of property. Both rights would only be protected 
against deliberately intended acts of abridgment.44 
43. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 750 (1947). 
44. The United States Supreme Court case that comes closest to illustrating this 
analogy is Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), 
a decision that foreshadowed and was cited favorably in Smith. Lyng involved a chal-
lenge to a forest service proposal to engage in logging around, and build a road through, 
sacred Indian religious sites located in a National Forest. The Court recognized that these 
government projects "could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious prac-
tices." ld. at 451. Despite these consequences (surely the spiritual equivalent of being 
denied all economically viable uses of one's land), the Court rejected the Indians' free 
exercise claims. In sharp contrast to takings decisions, the Court held that the Free Exer-
cise Clause "does not ... imply that incidental effects of government programs, which 
may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to 
coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require government to 
bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful actions." Id. at 450-51. 
The Court did suggest, however, that deliberate discrimination against religions "that 
treat particular physical sites as sacred" would violate the Constitutional protection pro-
vided religious freedom. ld. at 453. 
The land at issue in Lyng belonged to the government, a fact the Court duly noted, 
but it is difficult to understand why federal ownership of the impacted property should be 
relevant to, much less dispositive of, the Court's decision. Indeed, in light of the Court's 
reasoning in Lyng and Smith, one must assume that the case would be decided the same 
way if plaintiffs sought to protect sacred Indian burial sites on private land from being 
submerged by incidental but foreseeable floods resulting from the construction of a fed-
eral dam on a navigable waterway. In either case, federal construction prerogatives 
would have to be limited in order to protect an individual's religious rights, a result that 
the Court is unwilling to accept. See generally Thiry v. Carlson, 887 F. Supp. 1407 
(D.Kan. 1995) (holding that condemnation of private property containing gravesite of 
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Property rights proponents cannot hope to avoid the impli-
cations of a Takings Clause doctrine grounded on the purpose 
rather than the effect of government action by arguing that in 
many cases the government must certainly be aware of the po-
tential impact of its actions and regulations on property owners 
even if the government does not explicitly desire to bring those 
consequences about. Such awareness, landowners might con-
tend, should justify government responsibility for the natural 
and anticipated effect of state action whether that result was pur-
posefully intended or not. As an abstract matter, of course, this 
argument has merit. In common law cases, and as a matter of 
common sense, one may plausibly contend that private persons 
(or state actors) who know with substantial certainty that adverse 
consequences will result from their conduct should be held to 
have intended those consequences for the purposes of determin-
ing legal liability for their actions.4s 
For constitutional purposes, however, neither the actual 
knowledge of government officials in foreseeing the results of 
their conduct, nor the fact that adverse consequences will directly 
and naturally follow state action, has been accepted as a substi-
tute for the purposeful burdening of protected groups or inter-
ests. In equal protection cases, for example, the Court has made 
it clear that regulations resulting in the disproportionate burden-
ing of suspect classes such as racial minorities or women are not 
unconstitutional unless plaintiffs can establish that the challenged 
religious significance to plaintiffs does not violate Free Exercise Clause because it in-
volves a neutral law of general applicability not intended to target religious activity). 
Indeed, since the Court's decision in Smith, several land use regulations have been 
challenged on free exercise grounds, but have been upheld as neutral laws of general 
applicability not directed at religious activity. See, e.g., Cornerstone Bible Church v. City 
of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464 (8th. Cir. 1991) (holding that neutral, generally applicable zon-
ing law limiting churches in city's central business district cannot be subject to free exer-
cise challenge unless plaintiff establishes that zoning law abridges "hybrid rights" 
involving additional protected interest); Rector, Wardens, and Members of the Vestry of St 
Banholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d. Cir. 1990) (upholding appli-
cation of neutral, generally applicable, landmark preservation ordinance to church prop-
erty against free exercise challenge despite resulting impact on church's religious 
charitable activities); Grace Community Church v. Town of Bethel, 1992 WL 174923 
(Conn. Super. July 16, 1992) (holding that neutral, generally applicable land use regula-
tion requiring a special use permit before church may be constructed in residential district 
does not violate Free Exercise Clause). But see First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of 
Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992) (holding that city landmark preservation ordinance 
violates church's free exercise rights in that challenged law is not neutral and abridges 
hybrid rights of freedom of speech and freedom of religion). 
45. See, e.g., Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093-94 (Wash. 1955) (citing the Re-
statement of Torts § 13a for the proposition that, for tort law purposes, defendants intend 
an act when they perform it for the purpose of bringing about an unconsented to contact 
or with substantial certainty that such a contact will occur). 
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laws were intended to serve a discriminatory purpose.46 More 
importantly, the Court holds the legislature's recognition that a 
law necessarily will have a substantial discriminatory effect does 
not establish that this foreseeable effect is intended. Thus, in the 
Court's words," 'Discriminatory purpose' ... implies more than 
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences; it im-
plies that the decision maker selected or reaffirmed a particular 
course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite 
of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."47 
Under this analysis, in Personnel Administrator of Massa-
chusetts v. Feeney,48 the Court rejected an equal protection claim 
brought by women protesting the "absolute lifetime preference" 
Massachusetts provided to veterans in hiring civil service em-
ployees. Since the challenged preference ranked veterans above 
all other candidates with passing scores on civil service examina-
tions, and 98% of veterans at the time of the lawsuit were male, 
the challenged system foreseeably produced "a gender-based 
civil service hierarchy, with women occupying low-grade clerical 
and secretarial jobs and men holding more responsible and re-
munerative positions."49 The legislature's awareness of these 
predictable consequences of providing a veterans preference, 
however, did not establish purposeful gender discrimination 
without additional proof that Massachusetts was deliberately try-
ing to "accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a ster-
eotypic and predefined place in the ... Civil Service. "so Since 
plaintiffs lacked such direct proof of invidious motive, their 
claims could not be sustained. 
If contemporary Takings Clause decisions reflected a similar 
analysis, property rights would be protected against purposeful 
invasions or purposeful regulations intended to deprive owners 
of all economically viable uses of their property, but not against 
unintended but clearly foreseeable consequences of government 
action. Only those construction activities engaged in (or land use 
regulations adopted) "because of" their adverse effect on land 
owners, not "in spite of" those results, would require the pay-
ment of just compensation to impacted owners. The current case 
46. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
47. Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 258 (1979). 
48. 442 u.s. 256 (1979). 
49. Id. at 285. 
50. Id. at 279. 
1996] PROPERTY RIGHTS GENIE 25 
law which routinely insists on the payment of just compensation 
for undesired effects would be directly reversed.s1 
51. Two Supreme Court cases in the early 1920's appear to require some showing of 
governmental intent to acquire or damage nearby property before owners can recover 
just compensation for land destroyed as a consequence of the construction of public 
works projects. In the most explicit case, J. Horstmann Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 138 
(1921), the government created a system of canals to move water from one watershed to 
another as part of an irrigation project. In doing so, water unexpectedly seeped or perco-
lated out of the canals in the new watershed causing a rise in lakes and groundwater that 
flooded the plaintiffs' property. The Court refused to find a taking, ostensibly on the 
grounds that the government did not intend for the flooding to occur. The case may be 
limited in its scope, however, in that the Court concluded that the effect on plaintiffs' 
property was totally unforeseeable and "it would border on the extreme to say that the 
government intended a taking by that which no human knowledge could even predict." 
ld. at 146. 
In Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924), another flooding case, the Court 
also refers to the government's lack of intent to flood the plaintiff's property as a basis 
for denying just compensation. The core holding of Sanguinetti is particularly unclear, 
however, since the flooding on which plaintiffs based their claim was not only unintended, 
it was also unexpected and sporadic. (It did not permanently displace the owner, but 
merely periodically interfered with some of the uses to which the property might be put.) 
Further, plaintiffs' claim that the flooding was caused by the government's construction 
project was criticized as "conjectural" since the property in question had been subject to 
periodic flooding before construction of the project had commenced. ld. at 149-50. 
Subsequent cases have made it clear that whatever lingering intent requirement may 
exist today, it has little to do with the question of whether the government wanted to 
bring about the flooding or other adverse impact on which property owner plaintiffs base 
their takings claim. Compare Sheldon v. United States, 7 F.3d 1022, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1993) 
(concluding that "[w]hether the government had the intent" to take the property was not 
relevant where "the government's actions did destroy ... and take the value [of plaintiff's 
property]"); Barnes v. United States, 538 F.2d 865, 871 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (noting that "plain-
tiffs need not allege or prove that defendant specifically intended to take property" as 
long as accumulation of excess sedimentation in river channel and subsequent flooding of 
plaintiffs' land was the natural consequence of dam construction by federal government); 
Eyherabide v. United States, 345 F.2d 565, 567 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (suggesting "(f]ederal law 
recognizes that, although there may be no official intention to acquire any property inter-
est, certain governmental actions entail such an actual invasion of private property rights 
that a constitutional taking must be implied"); with Miller v. United States, 583 F.2d 857, 
863-64 (6th Cir. 1978) (explaining that one of the factors courts have considered in deter-
mining if a flood caused by government construction project constitutes a "taking" is "an 
evaluation [of whether the submersion of plaintiffs' land] ... was intended or contem-
plated by the Government as a necessary part of its plans"). See generally, Poorbaugh v. 
United States, 27 Fed. CI. 628, 633 (1993) (noting "[f]or a taking to occur, there must be an 
intent on the part of defendant to take plaintiffs' property, or an intention to do an act the 
natural consequences of which was to take their property."); Columbia Basin Orchard v. 
United States, 132 F. Supp. 707 (a. CI. 1955) (concluding that since government must 
intend to appropriate property for the use of the public for a taking to be found, unfore-
seeable contamination of plaintiff's orchard that may have been the result of govern-
ment's negligence cannot constitute a taking). 
If intent is required at all, it "can be implied from the facts" of the case. See, e.g., 
Foster v. United States, 607 F.2d 943, 950 (Ct. CI. 1979); Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 
F.2d 786, 818 (Ct. Cl. 1978). More importantly, to establish intent, "[t]he facts need only 
demonstrate that the invasion of property rights was the result of acts the natural and 
probable consequences of which were to effect [an invasion of plaintiffs' property]." Ber-
enholz v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 620, 627 (1982), aff'd, 723 F.2d 68 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
Indeed, many opinions explicitly reject an intent requirement or even a showing that the 
26 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 13:7 
Indeed, the analogy between equal protection and takings 
cases is an embarrassingly apt one in light of the abundance of 
language in takings cases suggesting that basic equality princi-
ples underlie Takings Clause decisions. The Takings Clause, we 
are repeatedly informed, exists primarily to prevent government 
from imposing discriminatory burdens on small groups of prop-
erty owners instead of spreading those costs among the general 
public.sz Accordingly, since the equal protection clause protects 
historically victimized minorities against purposeful discrimina-
tion, but not incidental harm, the Takings Clause might plausibly 
be interpreted to give property owners (who have not been his-
torically disabled from using the political system to their advan-
tage) no greater protection.sJ 
Ill. JUSTIFYING THE INFRINGEMENT OF RIGHTS 
For the most part, constitutionally protected rights are not 
absolute. Even the most aggressively protected interest such as 
freedom of speech and freedom of religion can be restricted if 
invasion of plaintiffs' land was foreseeable. See, e.g., King v. United States, 427 F.2d 767 
(Ct. Cl. 1970} (concluding that owners of land submerged under lingering flood waters 
due to construction of a darn by Corps of Engineers suffered a compensable taking 
notwithstanding the fact that engineers underestimated backwater effect created by dam); 
LL. Richard v. United States, 282 F.2d 901, 904 (Ct. Cl. 1960) (noting "(i]t is not even 
necessary for plaintiff to show that (the state] was aware ... the taking of an interest in ... 
property would naturally result from its acts."); Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 75 F. 
Supp. 232, 235 (Ct. Cl. 1948) (holding that plaintiffs need not prove "Government's 
agents were aware" their acts would result in a taking as long as the flooding of plaintiffs' 
property was natural, albeit attenuated, consequence of the construction of federal dams); 
Bettini v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 755, 760 (1984) (explaining that to recover just compen-
sation for a taking, "(i]t is not necessary that the damage (to private property] be a collat-
eral effect within the contemplation of the officials responsible for a government 
project"). 
Obviously, if the government is only obligated to pay just compensation for those 
consequences it deliberately sought to bring about, few, if any, of the property owners in 
the cases cited above could have recovered compensation for the taking of their land. 
52. "One of the principle purposes of the Takings Clause is 'to bar Government 
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.'" Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 
(1994} (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
53. The Takings Clause is not the only constitutional provision that limits unequal 
treatment and unfairness through an effects test, rather than the more limited prohibition 
against purposeful discrimination that defines equal protection and free exercise rights. 
Under the dormant Commerce Clause, for example, state regulations that have the effect 
of discriminating against or unreasonably burdening interstate commerce will be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny and struck down, regardless of whether or not the challenged law 
was protectionist on its face or in its intent. See, e.g., Associated Industries of Missouri v. 
Lohman, 114 S. Ct. 1815 (1994); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 
1677 (1994). Again, economic interests seem to be at least as well protected by the Con-
stitution as their personal liberty counterparts. 
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the state can establish that it had a sufficiently strong reason for 
doing so.s4 
To be sure, the burden of justification placed on the state 
may be very high. In many cases, the Court applies strict scrutiny 
to laws that penalize the exercise of fundamental rights. A con-
tent or viewpoint discriminatory law that regulates speech, a law 
that substantially interferes with the right to marry, or a law that 
singles out and suppresses the religious practice of a particular 
faith will only be upheld if the state can demonstrate that the law 
is necessary to the furtherance of a compelling state interest. 
Few laws can withstand this level of review.ss 
Not all laws that interfere with the exercise of fundamental 
rights receive this kind of rigorous review, however. In the free 
speech area, for example, content neutral laws may substantially 
interfere with a speaker's expressive activity by restricting the 
time, place, and manner of speech. Yet many content neutral 
regulations of speech are often upheld under a multi-factor test 
that evaluates the importance of the state's interest, the availabil-
ity of alternative avenues of expression, and the degree to which 
the state may be burdening substantially more speech than is 
necessary to advance the state's legitimate interests.s6 Similarly, 
certain categories of speech, such as commercial speech and of-
fensive language, are lesser protected expression that may be 
regulated under a relatively lenient standard of review.57 Finally 
some kinds of speech, notably obscenity and "fighting words" are 
unprotected by the First Amendment and may be prohibited by 
the state at its discretion.ss 
54. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding content discrimina-
tory law prohibiting the distribution of political campaign material within 100 feet of the 
entrance of a polling place on election day); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982) 
(upholding "imposition of social security taxes [on members of the Amish religion] who 
object on religious grounds to receipt of public insurance benefits and to payment of taxes 
to support public insurance funds."). 
55. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (invalidating content discriminatory 
regulation of speech under strict scrutiny); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (in-
validating law that penalizes the right to marry under strict scrutiny); Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. a. 2217 (1993) (striking down law 
violating free exercise rights under strict scrutiny). 
56. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Frisby v. Schultz, 
487 U.S. 474 (1988). But see, Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (invalidating regulation 
because it was found not to be content-neutral and state interest was not compelling 
enough to overcome this discrimination). 
57. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Com'n, 447 U.S. 557 
(1980); F. C. C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
58. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
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The contrast between the balancing of interests inherent in 
the review of laws that burden personal liberty rights and takings 
clause doctrine is extraordinary. There is one common ground. 
Certain uses of property are essentially unprotected by the Tak-
ings Clause just as certain categories of speech are unprotected 
under the First Amendment.s9 More specifically, any use of 
property that constitutes a common law nuisance falls outside of 
the coverage of the Takings Clause and may be prohibited by the 
state without the payment of just compensation.6o 
The similarity ends here, however. For all property that is 
constitutionally protected, essentially all uses of land other than 
those that constitute a common law nuisance, the Takings Clause 
is an absolute right. Any regulation or invasion of property that 
infringes the owner's property rights must result in the payment 
of just compensation. No governmental interest, however vital it 
may be to the public welfare, will outweigh an owner's right to 
maintain both the physical integrity and economic viability of his 
land. No governmental interest is sufficiently compelling to 
justify the taking of property without the payment of just 
compensation.6t 
59. Obscenity is a classically recognized category of unprotected speech. See, e.g., 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
60. See Lucas, 112 S. a. at 2899-902. To be more precise, the state may impose any 
limits on the use of land that are inherent "in the restrictions that background principles 
of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership" without 
paying just compensation to the property owner. I d. at 2900. While limits of this kind that 
avoid Takings Clause constraints are most frequently recognized in the common law of 
nuisance, other background principles may also justify similar restrictions on land use. In 
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 317 Or. 131, 854 P.2d 449 (1993), for example, the Ore· 
gon Supreme Court held that the doctrine of custom created a public right of access for 
recreational use on all dry sand beaches in the state. More importantly, custom consti-
tuted the kind of background principle of state law referred to by the Supreme Court in 
Lucas that allowed severe restrictions to be placed on the use of private land without the 
payment of just compensation. 
The property owners petition for a writ of certiorari was denied in Stevens, 114 S. Ct. 
1332 (1994) with Justices Scalia and O'Connor dissenting. 
61. Building on some obscure and seldom implemented language in Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,261 (1980) suggesting that determining whether property has been 
taken "necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests," some courts have 
advocated "judicial balancing" in takings decisions. See, e.g., Florida Rock Industries, 
Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). On closer analysis, however, it be-
comes clear that what such courts envision often is not really a balancing test in that the 
public good is never factored into the equation by weighing it against the burden on the 
property owner. Thus, in Florida Rock, for example, the Federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peals explains that the analysis it endorses "should not be read to suggest that when Gov-
ernment acts in pursuit of an important public purpose, its actors are excused from 
liability." Id. at 1571. Rather, despite its references to "balancing," the court proposes a 
takings test that focuses exclusively on the impact of a law on the property owner, 
although it requires an evaluation of several factors. Under this ad hoc standard, courts 
would be concerned with whether the benefits of the challenged regulation are "general 
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Indeed, a comparison of conventional fundamental rights ju-
risprudence and Takings Clause decisions reveals an even more 
dramatic dissonance between property and personal liberty 
rights. Not only do courts refuse to balance the importance of 
the state's interest in regulating property against the owners' 
rights of use in determining whether the payment of just compen-
sation is required, they actually reverse the traditional analysis. 
In determining whether a compensable taking has occurred, the 
courts view the benefits the public derives from regulating prop-
erty, not as a justification for upholding a challenged regulation, 
but rather as evidence that supports the owner's demand for 
compensation. Thus, courts contend that the greater the benefit 
to the public welfare resulting from a land use regulation that 
interferes with the owner's use of his property, the more appro-
and widely shared through the community and the society, while the costs are focused on 
a few" and whether there are "direct compensating benefits accruing to the property, and 
others similarly situated, flowing from the regulatory environment." Id. Whatever the 
merits or drawbacks of the Florida Rock approach may be, it certainly does not involve a 
balancing test. 
The great majority of courts make it clear that no matter how important the govern-
ment's goals may be, they cannot outweigh the constitutional obligation to pay just com-
pensation when property is taken for the public good. The irrelevance of the state's 
objective is the same whether a physical taking or a regulatory taking is at issue. In either 
case, public needs do not justify infringing property rights. See, e.g., Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 
2899 (arguing that "[w]here the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all 
economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically ante-
cedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use inter-
ests were not part of his title to begin with."); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982) (insisting that "when the 'character of the governmen-
tal action' ... is a permanent physical occupation of property, our cases uniformly have 
found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action 
achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the 
owner."); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(recognizing that "[t)here can be no doubt today that every effort must be made individu-
ally and collectively to protect our natural heritage, and to pass it to future generations 
unspoiled" but by virtue of the Takings Clause "the cost of obtaining that public benefit" 
cannot be imposed on specific property owners); Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 
1378 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that the "Government's need in the interest of public 
health and safety to monitor ... ground water contamination" cannot justify locating 
ground water wells and related equipment on plaintiffs' land without the payment of just 
compensation); Maine National Bank v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 626, 635 (1994), appeal 
granted, 42 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that takings do occur even when the taking 
is done for the benefit of the public); Dooley v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n of the 
Town of Fairfield, 197 A.2d 770,773 (Conn. 1964) (concluding that although the objective 
of city in changing zoning in area to flood plain district "is a laudable one and although 
we have no reason to doubt the high purpose of their action, these factors cannot over-
come constitutional principles"); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of 
Parsippany- Troy Hills, 193 A.2d 232, 241 (N.J. 1963) (noting that regulation designating 
plaintiffs' property as a flood water detention basin serves "laudable public purposes," 
but "such factors cannot cure basic unconstitutionality"). 
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priate it is to insist that the public pay landowners for any loss of 
value they experience.62 
By renovating Takings Clause doctrine to make property 
rights more analogous to personal liberty rights, the immunity of 
property rights to governmental justifications for taking land 
could be reduced or even eliminated. A wide range of govern-
mental interests have been accepted as justifying the regulation 
of speech, religion, and privacy and autonomy rights. It is not 
difficult to imagine how those same interests or analogous gov-
ernmental goals might be construed to permit the taking of prop-
erty without the payment of just compensation.63 
62. See, e.g., Yancy v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (explaining 
that government quarantine of poultry to avoid spread of disease, resulting in substantial 
losses to poultry farmers, constitutes a taking on the grounds that "[i]f the intent of the 
poultry quarantine was to benefit the public, the public should be responsible for [prop-
erty owners'] losses"); Rorida Rock Industries, Inc. 11. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 176 
(1985), rev'd in part on other grounds, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that "courts 
do not view the public's interest in environmental and aesthetic values as a servitude 
upon all property, but as a public benefit that is widely shared and therefore must be paid 
for by all"); Annicelli 11. Town of SoUlh Kingstown, 463 A.2d 133, 140 (R.I. 1983) (holding 
that compensation must be provided to owners subject to challenged land use regulation 
because "the overall purpose of the ordinance in question is to benefit the public welfare 
by protecting vital natural resources, here barrier beaches, and preserving them for pos-
terity"); State v. R.B. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970) (concluding that wetlands 
preservation law constitutes a taking because "[t]he benefits from [the preservation of 
wetlands] extend beyond town limits and are state-wide," and, therefore, "the cost of its 
preservation should be publicly borne"). 
63. In Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (lOth Cir. 1980), for example, plaintiffs 
argued that the government's construction of the Glen Canyon Dam had resulted in the 
flooding of a spring, prayer site and cave "of central importance" to the religion of Nav-
ajo people living in the area. While conceding that the plaintiffs' lack of an ownership 
interest in the property at issue was not dispositive of their free exercise claim, the court 
held that the state's interest in maintaining the water and power project outweighed 
plaintiffs' right to the free exercise of their religion. Thus, in this pre-Smith free exercise 
case, flooding caused by federal construction projects will outweigh and justify the 
abridgement of free exercise rights, but it cannot outweigh or justify the abridgement of 
property rights without the payment of just compensation. Similarly, in Denver Urban 
Renewal Authority v. Pillar of Fire, 552 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1976), the court held that the state 
interest in urban renewal outweighed plaintiffs' free exercise rights and justified the con-
demnation of a church building even if the building was of unique significance to plain-
tiffs' religion. 
See, also Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (holding that 
aesthetic goals justify prohibition against posting signs on utility poles); Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (declaring that noise control objective outweighs free 
speech rights of musicians); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (holding that residential 
tranquility justifies restrictions on use of loud speakers); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 
453 U.S. 490 (1981) (finding that aesthetics and traffic safety concerns support regulation 
of signs); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (regulating the 
location of an adult movie theatre by the city is permissible to promote quality of urban 
life). 
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IV. IDENTIFYING THE INFRINGEMENT OF 
PROPERTY AND PERSONAL LIBERTY 
RIGHTS 
31 
An anticipated response to the contention that property 
rights, unlike personal liberty interests, cannot be outweighed by 
important state interests might suggest that the inviolability of 
property rights against state takings is appropriate in light of the 
infrequency of judicial findings that a taking has occurred in the 
first place. While minor burdens on an individual's freedom of 
speech or freedom of religion or personal privacy might be rec-
ognized as infringing a constitutional right, a regulatory taking is 
predicated on a finding that the owner has been deprived of any 
economically viable use of her property. Given the magnitude of 
the burden that must be demonstrated to establish an infringe-
ment of property rights, it is hardly surprising that once a taking 
is determined to exist, it cannot be easily balanced away. 
The argument has some merit, but it is not precisely on 
point. Even substantial burdens on personal liberty interests 
may be justified in appropriate circumstances. A total ban on 
certain forms of expressive activity may be upheld against first 
amendment challenge, for example.64 There seems little logic in 
arguing that since both minor and substantial burdens on per-
sonal liberty interests will only be upheld if they are outweighed 
by sufficiently important state interests, substantial burdens on 
property rights should never be upheld without the payment of 
compensation because in many cases minor interferences with 
property rights receive no constitutional protection whatsoever. 
If it is true that minor infringements of personal liberty are rigor-
ously scrutinized while minor burdens on property are ignored, 
that still does not explain why significant burdens on property 
rights can never be justified by compelling state interests. At 
best this comparison simply suggests that in at least one context, 
involving relatively minor infringments on rights, there is some-
thing to be gained by treating property rights the same way that 
we treat personal liberty interests. 
Moreover, on closer analysis the disparate treatment of mi-
nor burdens on property and personal liberty rights may not be 
that obvious or extreme. First, with regard to physical takings, 
minor burdens are recognized as takings even if there is virtually 
no diminution in the value of the invaded property. In Loretto v. 
64. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding a ban on residential 
picketing); Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (upholding a ban on 
the posting of signs on utility poles). 
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Teleprompter Manhauen CATV Corp.,6s for example, the instal-
lation of a small cable box on the roof of an apartment building 
was held to be a taking. Defendant's arguments that the prop-
erty owner's claim " 'consists entirely of insisting that some neg-
lible unoccupied space remain unoccupied' "66 and that the 
availability of cable service " 'likely increases both the building's 
resale value and its attractiveness on the rental market' "67 were 
dismissed as only relevant to the amount of compensation due 
the owner, not to the question of whether a taking had occurred. 
Second, regulatory takings are sometimes found despite the 
fact that the subject property may retain considerable market 
value. The interference with plaintiffs' property must be substan-
tial to establish a regulatory taking, but it need not involve the 
total elimination of the property's value.6s 
Third, and most importantly, not all liberty rights are gener-
ously protected against governmental burdens. Indeed, in some 
cases the Court has insisted that only the most substantial inter-
ference with the exercise of a right will invoke judicial review of 
an alleged infringement. The most obvious example of the lim-
ited protection provided to certain personal liberty rights under 
current case law is the analysis of the right to have an abortion as 
it is described in the joint opinion by Justices Kennedy, 
O'Connor, and Souter in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.69 
In Casey, the plurality opinion interpreted the right of pri-
vacy to protect women from only those regulations that unduly 
burdened their decision to terminate a pregnancy. An undue 
burden was defined as "shorthand for the conclusion that a state 
65. 458 u.s. 419 (1982). 
66. Id. at 438 n.15 (quoting state court of appeals decision, 53 N.Y.2d 124, 141 
(1981), 440 N.Y.S.2d 843, 851 (1981), 423 N.E.2d 320, 328 (1981)). 
67. ld. 
68. See, e.g., Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8 (rejecting the "assumption that the land-
owner whose deprivation is one step short of complete is [always] not entitled to compen-
sation"); Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(arguing that a regulatory taking may occur even though property owners have not been 
denied all economically viable uses of their property); Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 
1534 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (concluding that government quarantine that led owner of breeder 
turkey flock to slaughter turkeys for market and lose 75% of their value constituted a 
taking); City of Anderson v. Associated Furniture & Appliances, Inc., 433 N.E.2d 293 296-
97 (Ind. 1981) (holding that letter from real estate appraiser indicating the most desirable 
and logical use for property is commercial, not residential, and that land would be worth 
15 times as much if wned commercial is sufficient evidence to establish that city's failure 
to rezone property for commercial use constitutes a taking). 
69. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). For an analysis of other 
rights that are only protected against substantial infringements, see Alan E. Brownstein, 
How Rights are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 
45 Hastings L.J. 867 (1994). 
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regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial ob-
stacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable 
fetus."7o In applying this standard the plurality demonstrated 
that regulations that increase the cost of having an abortion, that 
delay the time at which an abortion might be obtained, that re-
sult in women being subjected to additional psychological dis-
tress, or that increase the health risks of having an abortion for 
certain women are not necessarily undue burdens. n 
The grounding of an infringement on the right to have an 
abortion in Casey on the substantial nature of the state's interfer-
ence with the exercise of that right suggests an obvious parallel 
between the protection provided property rights and the protec-
tion provided at least certain personal liberty interests. Indeed, 
while takings opinions do not use the term "undue burden" ex-
plicitly, they do strongly suggest that only excessive government 
regulations that "go too far" in restricting the owners' use of 
their property will violate the constitution.n This conceptual link 
between the idea of an "undue" burden in Casey and the exces-
sive regulation of real property condemned in recent takings de-
cisions demonstrates an already existing fungibility of treatment 
between property and certain personal liberty interests in the 
case law.73 Certainly, it belies the notion that infringements of 
private property rights are always much less likely to be recog-
nized as requiring constitutional scrutiny than are burdens on 
personal liberty rights. 
70. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820. 
71. For example, the plurality opinion upheld Pennsylvania's 24 hour waiting period 
requirement despite the district court's findings that this regulation would have the effect 
of " 'increasing the cost and risk of delay of abortions.' " Id. at 2825. 
72. This "goes too far" language, which originated in Justice Holmes' opinion in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922), has been repeated regularly in 
takings cases, most recently in Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893. 
73. The language used by courts to describe the magnitude of effect that will consti-
tute a taking often parallels the plurality's description of an undue burden in Casey. See, 
e.g., Skaw v. United Stares, 740 F.2d 932,939 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining that in reviewing 
a takings claim, "the heart of the inquiry is whether the governmental action is so onerous 
as to constitute a Fifth Amendment taking"); Benenson v. United States, 548 F.2d. 939,949 
(Ct. Cl. 1977) (noting that a regulation constitutes a taking if it is unacceptably "extensive, 
restrictive, and burdensome"); Eyherabide v. United Stares, 345 F.2d 565, 567 (Ct. Cl. 
1965) (suggesting that "(t]he interference with use or possession may be so substantial 
and of such a character that it cannot be done without compensation") Poorbaugh v. 
United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 628,633 (1993) (holding that "(b]ecause plaintiffs' allegations do 
not show a direct and substantial interference with their property rights," plaintiffs' tak-
ings claim must fail). 
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V. PROTECfiNG SETILED EXPECfATIONS AND 
PROMOTING FAIRNESS 
Supreme Court case law has repeatedly suggested that the 
Takings Clause is grounded on two basic principles: a commit-
ment to justice and fairness in allocating the costs of government 
among the citizens of a community74 and an equally strong belief 
in the importance of protecting the settled expectations of indi-
viduals engaged in productive undertakings.7s The two principles 
are not completely distinct, of course. They overlap to some 
extent. 
While the protection of settled expectations may primarily 
serve utilitarian goals by creating the kind of stable and predict-
able regulatory environment that motivates work and invest-
ment, there is a fairness dimension to this objective as well. It 
seems fundamentally unfair to allow government to change the 
rules in the middle of the game after important reliance interests 
have developed under the previous legal regime.76 But the pro-
tection of settled expectations by itself only promotes one form 
of regulatory fairness. Takings doctrine also seeks some just 
equilibrium between those who receive the benefits of public 
programs and those who are asked to bear the costs of govern-
mental activities.77 
The exact way in which the Takings Clause operates to pro-
tect settled expectations, however, has been far less clear than 
the language in judicial opinions purporting to support this con-
cern. In Pennsylvania Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York,1s 
for example, the Court listed "the extent to which the regulation 
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations" as 
one of the relevant factors it would consider in determining 
74. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. a. 2309, 2316 (1994) (quoting Arm-
strong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) to affinn that a principal purpose of the 
Takings Clause is to promote "fairness and justice" in the allocation of public burdens); 
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (explaining that Court's determination that denying owners all 
economically viable uses of their land constitutes a taking is grounded on recognition that 
losses of such severity are less likely to involve " 'adjusting the benefits and burdens of 
economic life' ... in a manner that secures an 'average reciprocity of advantage' to every-
one concerned"). 
75. See Lucas, 112 S. a. at 2899 (describing how Court's "takings jurisprudence" 
has traditionally recognized the importance of protecting property owner's expectations); 
id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the "Takings Clause ... protects private 
expectations to ensure private investment"). 
76. See generally Frank I. Michelman, Property Utility and Fairness: Comments on 
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967). 
77. See Lucas, 112 S. a. at 2894. 
78. 438 u.s. 104 (1978). 
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whether or not a regulation takes property.79 Nonetheless, in 
Penn Central, New York's denial of the owners' application to 
construct an office tower over a railroad terminal was upheld on 
the grounds that the city's action did not interfere with the own-
ers' "primary expectation"so regarding the use of their land, its 
continued profitable operation as a railroad terminal. 
Owner expectations received more substantial protection in 
Kaiser Aetna v. United States,sl a case involving the dredging of a 
channel between a private pond and navigable waterways for the 
purpose of constructing an expensive private marina on the 
pond's border. Petitioners engaged in this massive construction 
project with the apparent acquiescence of the Army Corp of En-
gineers only to be told at its conclusion that by connecting the 
pond to a navigable waterway they had transformed the status of 
their property. Since the site of the marina now fronted on a 
navigable waterway it could no longer be maintained as an exclu-
sively private enterprise and was subject to a right of access by 
the general public.sz 
The Court rejected the Corps of Engineers' claim of a right 
of public access to the marina. While the status of the marina 
may have been uncertain as a formal matter after the dredging 
was completed,s3 the Court concluded that the government, 
through the Corps of Engineers' actions, had engendered reason-
able expectations on the part of the owners that the marina they 
constructed would be reserved for the private benefit of the own-
ers. "While the consent of individual officers representing the 
United States cannot 'estop' the United States," the Court ex-
plained, "it can lead to the fruition of a number of expectancies 
... that, if sufficiently important, the Government must condemn 
and pay for before it takes over the management of the land-
owner's property."84 
The more recent case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Councilss enshrines the protection of landowner expectations to 
79. Id. at 124. 
80. ld. at 136. 
81. 444 u.s. 164 (1979). 
82. Id. at 167-68. 
83. ld. at 170. 
84. I d. at 179. See also Hamilton Bank of Johnson City 11. Williamson County Re-
gional Planning Commission, 729 F.2d 402, 406 (6th Cir. 1984), vacated on ripeness 
grounds, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (explaining that even if property owner did not have "a 
vested right under state law to finish the (proposed] development, its claim that a taking 
occurred would not necessarily be foreclosed ... [if the developer] had a reasonable 
expectation that the development could be completed" in light of the Planning Commis-
sion's earlier decisions). 
85. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
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an even greater degree. After noting that "'takings' jurispru-
dence ... has traditionally been guided by the understandings of 
our citizens regarding the content of, and the State's power over, 
the 'bundle of rights' that they acquire when they obtain title to 
property,"86 the Court concluded as a general matter that certain 
expectations were inherent in our constitutional culture. With-
out regard to whether or not the state has engaged in actions that 
engender such an expectation (the predicate for the Court's con-
clusion in Kaiser Aetna), all landowners have the protected ex-
pectation that the state will not deprive them of all economically 
viable uses of their property.87 The only circumstances in which 
owners might be held to reasonably expect that their land could 
be so restricted in its use as to render it valueless would be those 
situations when state law justified restrictions of comparable se-
verity under the common law to abate a private or public 
nuisance.ss 
The Takings Clause is not the only constitutional provision 
that purports to protect the reasonable expectations of individu-
als, however. Several personal liberty rights are grounded at 
least in part on the relationship between the protection of rea-
sonable expectations and reliance interests and basic principles 
of fairness and justice. Since property rights proponents seek to 
bring Takings Clause doctrine more in line with the protection 
provided personal liberty interests, one presumes that such advo-
cates believe that this sought after alignment will increase the 
Court's respect for the reasonable investment expectations of 
landowners. Once again, however, the allegedly preferential 
treatment provided personal liberty interests seems sadly 
overstated. 
Procedural due process rights, for example, may be usefully 
compared to takings doctrine on this issue.89 The liberty and 
property interests protected against deprivation without due pro-
86. Id. at 2899. 
f57. Id. at 2895. 
88. Id. at 2900-01. 
89. Since procedural due process rights protect both property and liberty interests, it 
may be argued that this right is not properly characterized as a personal liberty right. 
Accordingly, analogies between takings doctrine and procedural due process rights are 
inapposite for the purposes of this article in that two kinds of constitutional protection 
provided to property are being compared to each other. There is not enough of a liberty 
component to procedural due process to justify contrasting it with the Takings Clause. 
There is a sense in which this criticism is justified. On balance, however, I believe 
that procedural due process rights are sufficiently grounded on a commitment to personal 
liberty to allow a property and liberty right comparison. Indeed, this personal liberty di-
mension to procedural due process exists even when the Due Process Clause is invoked to 
challenge a deprivation of what the Court refers to as "property". 
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cess are also defined in part by individual expectations and per-
sonal reliance interests.90 While an individual's unilateral 
aspirations to receiving governmental largess do not fall within 
the coverage of the due process clause, reasonable expectations 
of continued employment or eligibility for other benefits has 
The contention that procedural due process is grounded on a personal liberty foun-
dation rests on two premises. First, many of the alleged "new property" interests at issue 
in due process cases seem to be hybrid interests despite the fact that they may be desig-
nated by the Court as either property or liberty. The right to one's reputation and good 
name, see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), the right to a driver's 
license, see, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), and the right to continued employ-
ment, see, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), all have characteristics that may 
justify their classification as either liberty or property. That the Court may choose to 
categorize each of these interests as either property or liberty in its cases does not dimin-
ish their uncertain nature and the extent to which they resist formal classification. In-
deed, the Court has explicitly recognized that the due process "analysis as to liberty 
parallels the accepted due process analysis as to property" and that due process protec-
tion applies with equal force "even when the liberty itself is a statutory creation of the 
State." See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) (applying due process to 
disciplinary action of state prison authorities that results in inmate's forfeiture of state 
created good time credits). 
Second, and most importantly, there is an intrinsic as well as an instrumental dimen-
sion to procedural due process rights. What the Constitution provides is a liberty right of 
individuals to be engaged in the process by which the state determines whether they will 
be deprived of valued interests. In Professor Tribe's words, 
[A due process) hearing represents a valued human interaction in which the af-
fected person experiences at least the satisfaction of participating in the decision 
that vitally concerns her, and perhaps the separate satisfaction of receiving an 
explanation of why the decision is being made in a certain way. Both the right to 
be heard from, and the right to be told why, are analytically distinct from the 
right to secure a different outcome; these rights to interchange express the ele-
mentary idea that to be a person, rather than a thing, is at least to be consulted 
about what is done with one. 
Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 10-7, at 666 (The Foundation Press, 
Inc., 2d ed. 1988). 
While Tribe concedes that the current Court has regularly ignored the dignitary as-
pect of procedural due process and focused on the instrumental function of process rights, 
id. at 668-78, the participatory value of due process cannot be avoided even by a court 
committed to an instrumentalist approach. The right to be heard will always mean more 
than the right not to suffer an unjustified deprivation. 
90. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (explaining that" 'prop-
erty' interests subject to procedural due process protection are not limited by a few rigid, 
technical forms ... (but rather denote] a broad range of interests that are secured by 
'existing rules and understandings' " on which individuals reasonably rely); Wolff, 418 
U.S. at 557 (noting that "the State having created the right to good time and itself recog-
nizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major misconduct, the prisoner's 
interest has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment 
'liberty' to entitle him [to minimal due process]"). Indeed, the similarity between the 
protection of property provided by the Takings Clause and the protection of property and 
liberty interests provided by procedural due process requirements is so clear that some 
justices on the Court referred to deprivations invoking due process as "takings." See, e.g., 
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 186 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (inquiring whether a hearing is required "before any 'taking' of the employee's 
property interest in his job occurs"). 
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been recognized as constituting "new property" on which people 
regularly rely "in their daily lives. "91 
Despite these ostensible similarities as to basic principles, it 
is clear that an individual's reasonable expectations receive far 
less protection in procedural due process cases than they do in 
takings decisions. Consider the Court's analysis in Bishop v. 
Wood,92 a seminal procedural due process case decided three 
years prior to the Kaiser Aetna case discussed previously. Peti-
tioner in Bishop was initially hired as a probationary police of-
ficer. After six months service, he became a permanent 
employee. A city ordinance stated that "[i]f a permanent em-
ployee fails to preform work up to the standard of the classifica-
tion held, or continues to be negligent, inefficient, or unfit to 
preform his duties, he may be dismissed by the City Manager."93 
Petitioner was fired two years after becoming a permanent em-
ployee without being provided a hearing to challenge the 
grounds for his dismissal. 
The Supreme Court held that the petitioner in Bishop had 
not been deprived of a liberty or property interest without due 
process. The Court conceded that the ordinance on which peti-
tioner relied might "fairly be read" to guarantee him continued 
employment subject only to his dismissal for cause.94 Despite the 
ostensible reasonableness of petitioner's expectation of contin-
ued employment, the Court determined that petitioner's claim 
for even minimal due process was foreclosed by the ruling of the 
district court below. The federal district court, without the bene-
fit of any authoritative interpretation of the ordinance at issue by 
a state court, had concluded on a motion for summary judgment 
that, as a formal matter of state law, petitioner "'held his posi-
tion at the will and pleasure of the city'" and as such could be 
fired at the city manager's discretion.9s Without an entitlement 
to continued employment, petitioner's claim to a due process 
hearing could not be sustained. 
The Court's reasoning in Bishop stands in stark contrast to 
the takings analysis it endorsed in Kaiser Aetna. For takings 
clause purposes, in Kaiser Aetna the uncertain formal status of 
91. See, e.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) 
(arguing that for procedural due process purposes, "(i)t is the purpose of the ancient insti-
tution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, 
reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined"). 
92. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). 
93. Id. at 344. 
94. Id. at 345. 
95. ld. 
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plaintiffs' property was largely ignored in light of the reasonable 
expectations engendered in the owners by the Army Corps of 
Engineers. When procedural due process rights were at issue in 
Bishop, however, the petitioner's reasonable expectations were 
entirely disregarded and the Court deferred to an attenuated, 
formal interpretation of state law. 
Justice Brennan essentially made the argument in dissent in 
Bishop that the Court would later accept so willingly in Kaiser 
Aetna. Surely, Brennan argued, 
before a state law is definitively construed as not securing a 
"property" interest, the relevant inquiry is whether it was ob-
jectively reasonable for the employee to believe he could rely 
on continued employment. . . . At a minimum, this would re-
quire in this case an analysis of the common practices utilized 
and the expectations generated by [the city], and the manner 
in which the local ordinance would reasonably be read by [the 
city's] employees.% 
The majority's response to this argument was to cavalierly 
reject what it described as Brennan's "remarkably innovative 
suggestion that we develop a federal common law of property 
rights."97 Had this approach been carried over and applied to 
96. ld. at 353-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
97. Id. at 350. Since the Court's decision in Bishop, lower courts have regularly and 
consistently ignored the actual and reasonable expectations of employees and licensees in 
determining whether a protected property interest exists for procedural due process pur-
poses. The only relevant issue for the courts has been whether employees have a valid 
entitlement to continue employment as a formal matter of state law. See, e.g., Gregory v. 
Hunt, 24 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that despite language in Personnel Manual and 
Employee Handbook and other factors arguably creating a subjective belief that peti-
tioner could only be discharged for cause, under written policy of university petitioner has 
no protected property interest in continued employment); Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-
Belendez, 903 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining that notwithstanding letter of engage-
ment hiring plaintiff and seven years of unblemished service, according to state regula-
tions plaintiff has no protected expectation of continued employment); Wofford v. Glynn 
Brunswick Memorial Hospital, 864 F.2d 117 (11th Cir. 1989) (concluding that at-will em-
ployees without written contracts cannot rely on internally administrated policies from 
employer's personnel manual to establish legitimate claim of entitlement to continued 
employment); Neuwirth, D.D.S. v. Louisiana State Board of Dentistry, 845 F.2d 553 (5th 
Cir. 1988) (determining that the use of the term "may" in licensing statute renders Board 
of Dentistry licensing decisions discretionary judgements that do not create protected 
entitlements without regard to other language of statute and common understanding of 
licensing framework); Evans v. City of Dallas, 861 F.2d 846,850 (5th Cir. 1988) (interpret-
ing language in personnel manual indicating that probationary employees may be dis-
charged at any time but that "[n]evertheless, valid reasons must exist for such discharge" 
as not creating a guarantee of continued employment subject to dismissal for cause); Can-
non v. Beckville Independent School Dist., 709 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1983) (determining that 
vote of School Board to extend superintendent's contract did not create a protected ex-
pectation of continued employment since formal contract was never executed); Bleeker v. 
Dukakis, 665 F.2d 401, 403 (1st Cir. 1981) (suggesting that even if "oral contract of em-
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takings clause jurisprudence, the marina owners in Kaiser Aetna 
would have been told to their dismay that the expectations en-
gendered by the Army Corps of Engineers were irrelevant to 
their property rights claims. As a technical matter, if connecting 
their private pond to a navigable waterway altered the legal na-
ture of their property, the formal status of the marina, not the 
reasonable expectations of the owners, would determine whether 
they could exclude the public from their new facility.9s 
Of course, a result in Kaiser Aetna that required the marina 
owners to open their new facility to the public would not only 
have ignored the legitimate expectations of the property owners, 
it would also have been profoundly unfair. This concern for basic 
fairness that motivates takings decisions such as Kaiser Aetna is 
also lacking in procedural due process cases involving the rights 
of public employees. In place of the "fairness and justice" to be 
afforded property owners whose reliance interests are protected 
by takings decisions, public employees seeking an opportunity to 
be heard before they are terminated without a hearing on the 
basis of allegedly false allegations are told that they "must accept 
the harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in 
the day-to-day administration" of government affairs.99 
ployment incorporated certain written 'Personnel Policies' "that provided employee with 
a right to a warning and an opportunity to correct unsatisfactory performance, such provi-
sions are not sufficient to create a protected property interest); Bates v. State of Wiscon-
sin, 823 F. Supp. 633, 641 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (holding that "unwritten, informal 
understanding" cannot create protected interest notwithstanding affidavits establishing 
common practice on which employee relied); St. George v. Mak, 842 F. Supp. 625, 629 (D. 
Conn. 1993) (noting that "'mutually explicit understandings'" between employer and 
employee cannot create a protected interest in continued employment when they are con-
trary to regulations and statutes); King v. Lensink, 720 F. Supp. 236 (D. Conn. 1989) 
(explaining that employee supervisor's representation that employee would not be re-
moved without cause does not guarantee continued employment if representation is in-
consistent with authorizing statutes). 
98. Perhaps the most extraordinary example of judicial unwillingness to allow a pro-
tected interest to be inferred from the reasonable expectations of an employee occurred 
in Baden, M.D. v. Koch, 638 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1980). In Baden, a provision of New York 
City's civil service law stated that employees in the plaintiff's position could only be fired 
for cause. The city's notice for civil service examinations for the position described it in 
similar terms. The Official Directory of the City of New York affirmed this description of 
plaintiff's tenure. Various articles in the New York limes confirmed this understanding. 
Even the Mayor of New York, who terminated the plaintiff from his position, interpreted 
the relevant legal framework as creating a permanent job with tenure. Id. at 488-89. Yet 
the Second Circuit concluded that plaintiff did not have a protected interest in continued 
employment in light of the court's interpretation of a city charter provision that arguably 
indicated that plaintiff served at the will of the Mayor. Id. at 493. Significantly, the court 
could not even reach a consensus on the panel as to the meaning of the purportedly 
dispositive charter provision with one member of the panel, Judge Mansfield, vigorously 
dissenting and challenging the majority's interpretation. Id. at 493-96 (Mansfield J., 
dissenting). 
99. Bishop, 426 U.S. at 345-50. 
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The protection provided by the Fourth Amendment against 
unreasonable searches and seizures is also grounded on the ex-
pectations of the individual, in this case the individual's reason-
able expectations of privacy.too As noted, the Court in Lucas 
concluded that landowners, at a minimum, have protected invest-
ment expectations rooted in our constitutional culture that their 
property will not be rendered valueless by state regulation. The 
only exception to the primacy of this expectation is the recogni-
tion that property rights are inherently subject to common law 
nuisance principles.toi 
It is difficult to envision a comparable commitment to an 
individual's expectations of privacy under contemporary Fourth 
Amendment holdings. Indeed, whatever expectations of privacy 
citizens once may have believed to be part of their constitutional 
heritage, those expectations have been thoroughly shredded by 
recent cases. The cases in this area are legion, but a few exam-
ples will suffice to make the obvious point. 
A property owner, for example, does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the interior of a locked, windowless 
bam fifty yards from his boundary line which was surrounded by 
multiple exterior and interior fences, two of which used barbed 
wire. (Heavy mesh netting over the bam door could be seen 
through but only by jumping up and pressing one's face against 
it. )102 Reasonable expections of privacy also do not exist in se-
cluded land protected by locked gates and no trespassing signs.I03 
Bank depositors also have no expectations of privacy with regard 
to bank deposits,I04 nor does anyone have an expectation of pri-
vacy as to the telephone numbers they cawos or in material they 
throw out in their garbage.106 Home owners also have no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy against aerial surveillance of their 
backyards despite a six foot high outer fence and a ten foot inner 
fence surrounding the property.1o1 Even large corporations, de-
spite extensive security precautions, have no expectation of pri-
vacy with regard to property located between buildings made 
visible through aerial surveillance using magnification.1os 
100. See Klllz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
101. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
102. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987). 
103. Maine v. Thornton, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
104. See United Stales v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); California Bankers Ass'n v. 
Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). 
105. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
106. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
107. California v. Ciraola, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
108. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
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The theme of these Fourth Amendment cases seems clear. 
Reasonable expectations of privacy do not depend on whether 
the government's statements or conduct provide individuals with 
any basis for anticipating unorthodox government surveillance of 
private activities. Rather, individuals must recognize that the ab-
stract possibility that any third party might somehow be able to 
scrutinize their actions or property will render them vulnerable 
to government searches.109 
If the distinct investment backed expectations of landowners 
received comparable treatment, it is hard to believe that numer-
ous takings cases would continue to be resolved in favor of the 
property owner. Certainly, in a constitutional regime in which 
the abstract possibility of a helicopter hovering several hundred 
feet over one's property defeats an individual's reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy, the claim of the farmer whose property was 
damaged by the sonic booms of aircraft flying overhead in U.S. v. 
Causbyllo would have had a dubious claim to protected expecta-
tions and just compensation. Similarly, the landlord in Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhatten CA1V Corp. who purchased her apart-
ment building with the invading cable box of the cable television 
company already installed on her rooflll would have difficulty 
109. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (arguing in plurality opinion that mere 
fact that members of the public might lawfully fly a helicopter 400 feet over petitioner's 
property establishes that petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial 
surveillance). 
110. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (holding that effect of low flying 
government aircraft using route approved by Civil Aeronautics Authority over plaintiff's 
farm constitutes taking). 
111. 458 U.S. 419,421-22 (1982). Determining the plaintiff landlord's reasonable in-
vestment backed expectations in Loretto is muddled by the complexity of the facts sur-
rounding her purchase of the apartment building on which the "invading" cable box was 
located. Plaintiff purchased the building in 1971 at which time the cable box and a variety 
of cables had already been installed on the building pursuant to an arrangement with the 
building's previous owner. At this time, however, cable service was not being provided to 
any of the building's tenants. 
At the time the building was purchased, the cable company offered landlords five 
percent of the gross revenues obtained by providing cable service to a building's tenants 
in return for the landlord's permission to install cable equipment on a building. This 
arrangement changed in 1973 when the state legislature passed a law prohibiting land-
lords from preventing the installation of cable equipment and sharply reducing the 
amount that cable companies were required to pay for the privilege of installing their 
equipment. One can imagine a situation in which a new landlord was aware that cable 
equipment had been installed at the time she purchased the building but did not protest 
that invasion because she assumed she would receive five percent of the revenue earned 
by the cable company. When the law changed and the payment offered by the cable 
company was substantially reduced, the landlord might plausibly argue that her distinct 
investment backed expectations were impaired. Her argument would be premised on the 
assumption that a reduction in the payment provided as compensation for a physical inva-
sion of her property had the same status for Takings Clause purposes as a new or addi-
tional, unexpected invasion of her property. 
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establishing a compensable taking if her property rights and in-
vestment backed expectations received no greater protection 
than personal liberty and privacy interests are provided under 
the Fourth Amendment.112 
Whatever the merits of this assumption may be, it is of limited relevance to Mrs. 
Loretto's takings claim. Since she was not aware of the existence of the cable boxes at the 
time of the building's purchase, id. at 424, she cannot easily claim that she relied on re-
ceiving five percent of the gross revenue earned by the cable company in deciding to 
purchase the building. Her claim would have to be based on the contention that the bare 
existence of the cable boxes on the building's roof defeated her investment backed expec-
tations despite the fact that she had not even noticed them being there, notwithstanding 
several inspections of the property, until some time after her purchase of the building. I d. 
at 443 n.2 (Biackmun, J., dissenting). 
112. To be sure, the courts have been inconsistent in the degree to which they protect 
the investment-backed expectations of property owners. In some cases, typically not in-
volving real property, the mere fact that property was to be used in an already heavily 
regulated industry was a sufficient basis for ruling that none of the owners' expectations 
of profitable use were justified. See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora-
tion, 475 U.S. 211 (1986); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1976); 
Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 122-25 (1974). But see Colorado Springs 
Production Credit Assoc. v. Farm Credit Administration, 967 F.2d 648, 656 (D.C. Cir. 
1992) (expressing uncertainty as to how to apply Supreme Court's suggestion "that doing 
business in a regulated field might reduce an enterprise's reasonable expectation of non-
interference" in takings cases in light of pervasiveness of governmental regulation). 
In other cases, however, the courts refused to engage in abstract evaluations of what 
owners should have expected and protected the owners' investment-backed expectations 
as long as no obvious threat of regulatory interference with the use of property had been 
brought to their attention. See, e.g., Maine National Bank v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 
626,634 (1994), appeal granted, 29 Fed. Cl. 606 (1993) (explaining that "(e]ven in a heav-
ily regulated industry, a claimant's waiver of rights is limited to what ... the property 
owners's reasonable, real-world expectations are when the property was acquired."); 
Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. CI. 37, 51 (1994) (noting that plaintiff did not have a 
reasonable expectation that his property was under the Corps of Engineers jurisdiction 
because nothing had been done to "red flag" that possibility and bring it to his attention). 
Courts are particularly likely to ignore the significance of on-going and substantial 
regulation of an industry in evaluating owner expectations when plaintiffs can identify 
specific government conduct that led to the development of their investment-backed ex-
pectations. See, e.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(explaining that in light of approval of mining company's leases by the Secretary of the 
Interior, and its compliance with all applicable regulations, company had reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations that it would be allowed to mine area it had leased); A. A. 
Profiles, Inc. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 850 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1988), (holding that after 
adoption of zoning resolution on which plaintiff had explicitly relied in acquiring and 
developing property, rezoning of land to obstruct development constituted a taking); 
Cienega Gardens v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 196, 222 (1995) (noting that while plaintiffs 
operated in a highly regulated field, their prepayment expectations "based on express 
language contained in their deed of trust notes and authorized by HUD" were reasonable 
and protected by the Takings Clause if investment-backed); NRG Co. v. United States, 24 
Cl. Ct. 51 (1991) (concluding that sale of prospecting permits with Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs approval created reasonable investment-backed expectation that permits would not 
be cancelled by legislation). 
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VI. JUDICIAL ACITVISM AND JUDICIAL RESTRAINT: 
LIMITING JUDICIAL VALUES AND SUBJECITVITY 
IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS 
In addition to disputes involving specific cases and doctrine, 
there has been considerable discussion in the case law and com-
mentary regarding more abstract questions of constitutional 
interpretation. At the risk of oversimplifying an obviously com-
plex set of issues, one framework of interpretation commonly 
discussed might be described as a model of judicial restraint. 
Four principles of interpretation characterize this approach. 
First, whenever it is possible to do so, rights should be defined to 
conform to the original understanding of their nature recognized 
by the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution.u3 Thus, for ex-
ample, since executing criminals was commonly accepted as a le-
gitimate form of punishment at the end of the eighteenth 
century, under an original intent analysis, the cruel and unusual 
punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment should not be in-
terpreted to prohibit the death penalty.u4 
Second, judicial subjectivity in applying standards of review 
to enforce rights should be reduced as much as possible. Generic 
balancing tests, particularly balancing tests without clear guide-
lines as to what is to be balanced and how weights are to be as-
signed, should be avoided. Balancing tests are problematic 
because they produce unpredictable and inconsistent results. 
More importantly, because of their inherent subjectivity, they in-
vite the incorporation of the judges' own values into constitu-
tional interpretation and, thereby, politicize the judicial 
function.us Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of this con-
cern about balancing, judicial values and subjectivity in the re-
cent case law, and the one that has been most vigorously 
113. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 
(1989). 
114. See Gregg v. Georgill, 428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976) (noting "[i]t is apparent from the 
text of the Constitution itself that the existence of capital punishment was accepted by the 
Framers."). 
115. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1175, 1179 (1989) (explaining that judicial restraint is furthered by the adoption of rules 
that constrain judges from deciding cases based on their own "political or policy prefer-
ences" as opposed to balancing tests which permit judges "to announce that, 'on balance,' 
we think the law was violated here-leaving ourselves free to say in the next case that, 
'on balance,' it was not"); Constitutional Law Conference, 60 U.S.L.W. 2253, 2263 (U.S. 
Oct. 22, 1991) (summarizing commentator's analysis of Justice Scalia's belief "that the 
means by which judicial decisions are arrived at under balancing tests and the like de-
stroys the Constitution as a document of law, and makes it a policy vehicle"); Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22 (1992). 
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criticized, is the Court's decision in Employment Division v. 
Smith.n6 
In Smith, the Court drastically reduced the protection the 
Free Exercise Clause provided to religious minorities by limiting 
the application of this constitutional provision to only those laws 
that deliberately and exclusively burden religious practices. Neu-
tral laws of general applicability cannot violate the Free Exercise 
Clause under this analysis regardless of how debilitating they 
may be to the ability of individuals to obey the tenets of their 
faith. The Court recognized the burden this holding would im-
pose on religious minorities, but defended its conclusion despite 
the resulting costs as clearly preferable to a system "in which 
judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the central-
ity of all religious beliefs."117 
The Court's aversion to judicial balancing is reflected in free 
speech cases as well as freedom of religion decisions. In Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism,ns for example, the Court revised the stan-
dard of review it applied to content neutral regulations of speech 
in a way that precluded lower courts from balancing the in-
creased effectiveness of a challenged regulation against the ad-
ded burden the regulation imposed on expression. In approving 
a less restrictive alternative standard, the Court determined that 
as long as the government only restricts speech that contributes 
to the problem the state is attempting to resolve, and as long as 
the regulation adopted advances the government's interest more 
effectively than a less burdensome alternative, a content neutral 
law must be upheld. Judicial attempts to balance marginal gains 
in furthering the state's interests against substantial burdens on 
targeted expression are no longer part of the first amendment 
calculus.l19 
Third, the judicial restraint model is respectful of federalism 
concerns. The uniformity in governmental decisionmaking that 
inherently results from the extended application of constitutional 
standards undermines the states' role as laboratories of democ-
116. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See, e.g., Sullivan, 106 Harv. L. Rev. at 84-86 (cited in note 
115) (noting that to avoid the "arbitrary, subjective, and manipulable standards" inherent 
in balancing free exercise claims against state interests, the Court was willing to "decon-
stitutionalize the issue and remit it to politics by allocating it to the deferential tier of 
rationality review"); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
1, 30-39 (criticizing the Court's concerns about balancing in Smith). 
117. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. The Court also exclaimed, "[I]t is horrible to contem-
plate that federal judges will regularly balance against the importance of general laws the 
significance of religious practice." Id. at 889 n.S. 
118. 491 u.s. 781 (1989). 
119. Id. at 798. 
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racy that may freely experiment with creative solutions to social 
problems.120 The "dispersion of governmental power across a 
federal system" constitutes an effective bulwark against state op-
pressiont21 that is undermined by an overly expansive interpreta-
tion of the procedural and substantive rights protected by the 
Constitution. 
Fourth, and finally, a commitment to judicial restraint recog-
nizes the primacy of political decisionmaking in a democracy and 
the secondary role of non-elected judges. Judicial decisions ap-
plying constitutional principles displace the people's judgment 
regarding the laws that govern society. The laws enacted by 
democratic representatives may not be wise. Indeed, they may 
be egregiously unfair and hurtful. Nonetheless, the appropriate 
response to such legislation should be political accountability, 
not judicial usurpation of the legislature's prerogatives.122 
Principles of judicial restraint are not always recognized by 
the Court and used to limit the scope of personal liberty rights. 
They are being applied with increasing frequency, however, as 
the limitations on personal liberty interests described above 
120. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 126 (1970) (arguing that "[i]n inter-
preting what the Fourteenth Amendment means, the Equal Protection Clause should not 
be stretched to nullify the States' powers over elections which they had before the Consti-
tution was adopted and which they have retained throughout our history."); Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,172 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (challenging the Court's incor-
poration of the right to a jury trial on the grounds that varying conditions among the 
states support a more permissive constitutional framework that allows for state experi-
mentation with criminal procedure); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,87 
(1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that "[t]he towns and villages of this Nation are 
not, and should not be, forced into a mold cast by this Court."); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 
259,265 (1978) (upholding intestate succession statute that classifies on the basis of legiti-
macy against equal protection challenge in part because the task of arranging for the 
orderly disposition of property at death " 'is a matter particularly within the competence 
of the individual States' "); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) 
(upholding dispersal zoning ordinance that requires separation of adult movie theatres 
against first amendment challenge in part because "the city must be allowed a reasonable 
opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems"); San Antonio 
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973) (noting that " '[t]he mainte-
nance of the principles of federalism is a foremost consideration in interpreting any of the 
pertinent constitutional provisions under which this Court examines state action' "). 
121. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 173 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
122. See generally William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 
Tex. L. Rev. 693 (1976); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the function of balancing the dangers created by subversive 
expression against free speech rights is more appropriately performed by the legislature 
rather than the courts); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 443 
(1985) (refusing to hold that mental retardation is a "quasi-suspect" classification becau~ 
the problem of determining how the mentally retarded are to be treated under the law IS 
"very much a task for legislators guided by qualified professionals and not by the perhaps 
ill-informed opinions of the judiciary"). 
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demonstrate with unmistakable clarity.l23 If property rights are 
governed by the same principles of judicial restraint that are ap-
plied to, or advocated for, personal liberty interests in the afore-
mentioned examples and others, a strong case can be made that 
the scope of Takings Clause protection would be significantly 
reduced. 
This article is not the appropriate place to even attempt to 
describe and evaluate the extensive scholarship that exists pur-
porting to recount the original understanding of the Takings 
Clause. Commentary can be cited that defends both a narrow 
and an expansive meaning of this provision.l24 What is clear, 
however, is that none of the Court's decisions expansively defin-
ing the Takings Clause are grounded on an historical or original-
ist analysis. Indeed, the Court has taken the exact opposite 
position. In the Lucas case, Justice Scalia's majority opinion pro-
vides an astonishingly non-originalist response to the pages of 
historical analysis presented by Justice Blackmun, in dissent, as a 
challenge to the majority's position on regulatory takings.I2s 
Blackmun's argument that the protection provided to prop-
erty rights by the majority's holding in Lucas "is not supported 
by early American experience" is all but discarded with the stark 
comment that this contention "is largely true, but entirely irrele-
vant."l26 The understanding of property and land use regulation 
123. Of course, on some occasions judicial restraint principles are in conflict with 
each other. On those occasions, however, the principle that most narrowly circumscribes 
the personal liberty interest at issue seems to be dominant. The Smith decision, for exam-
ple involved a conflict between a commitment to originalism and resistance to subjective, 
value based balancing. Originalism lost and free exercise rights against laws of general 
applicability were repudiated. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and 
the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 259, 260 (1993) (criticizing 
Justice Scalia's decision in Smith on the grounds that it "totally ignores both the text and 
history of the Free Exercise Clause"); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical 
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409 (1990); Michael W. 
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109 
(1990). 
124. Compare Roger Clegg, Reclaiming the Text of the Takings Clause, 46 S.C. L. 
Rev. 531 (1995) (arguing that though current Supreme Court doctrine has textual roots, 
there is much in Supreme Court jurisprudence that is not consistent with that text); Wil-
liam Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political 
Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782 (1995) (asserting that modem takings jurisprudence has 
essentially ignored the original understanding of the Takings Clause); with Lawrence Les-
sig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 395 (1995) 
(arguing that twentieth century Supreme Court doctrine, including takings, can be read in 
a way that is consistent with the text of the Constitution); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Origi-
nal Understanding of the Taking Clause is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 
1630 (1988) (asserting that the constitutional protection intended by the framers for prop-
erty has not disintegrated, it is simply misunderstood). 
125. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2914-17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
126. Id. at 2900 n.15. 
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in America at the time of the Constitution's ratification has no 
relevance to the Court's understanding of the Takings Clause to-
day because the historical practices of some states, from Justice 
Scalia's perspective, were inconsistent with any "plausible inter-
pretation" of the Takings Clause.121 Scalia concedes that "Justice 
Blackmun is correct that early constitutional theorists did not be-
lieve the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at 
all. "us This historical evidence is also ignored on the grounds 
that it would be inconsistent with the Court's contrary conclusion 
in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,129 the pre-eminent regulatory 
takings case decided by the Court in 1922. 
Thus, as a matter of judicial decisionmaking, the Takings 
Clause appears to be immune from the kind of original intent 
analysis that has been used to limit the scope of personal liberty 
interests. Accordingly, any attempt to reformulate takings doc-
trine to be consistent with the treatment of personal liberty rights 
would have to reflect the boundaries, currently ignored, that are 
imposed by a philosophy of judicial restraint. Those parameters 
may well restrict the scope of current takings clause doctrine. In-
deed, the very concept of a regulatory taking requiring the pay-
ment of just compensation might be in jeopardy.13o 
If judicial restraint also counsels against the adoption of 
standardless, subjective balancing tests and discourages using the 
personal values and policy judgements of judges to give meaning 
to ambiguous constitutional provisions, then recent takings cases 
are clear examples of judicial activism and are of uncertain valid-
ity. For when property rights are at issue, judicial restraint con-
cerns about the personal values of judges, balancing and activism 
seem to fall by the wayside. In the Lucas case, for example, the 
Court faced a difficult, line-drawing problem. States claimed the 
power to prohibit the harmful use of private property without 
paying just compensation to the owners. The Court recogrrized 
that an exception of this kind to conventional Takings Clause 
guarantees was historically grounded in precedent and could not 
be avoided in practical terms.m The problem to be addressed 
was how to limit the scope of this exception so that it would not 
be used abusively to undercut legitimate claims to just compensa-
127. Id. 
128. ld. 
129. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900 n.15 (arguing that the histori-
cal evidence is inconsistent with Mahon). 
130. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2914-17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) and sources cited 
therein. 
131. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896-99. 
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tion by owners whose property uses could not reasonably be de-
scribed as harmful to the public.132 
It is difficult to imagine any solution to this dilemma that 
would not involve some judicial discretion. A commitment to ju-
dicial restraint, however, obviously required an answer that 
respected the legislature's role in determining what uses of prop-
erty are unacceptably harmful to society. Instead, the Lucas 
Court concluded that the prerogative of deciding what uses of 
property are so harmful that they may be prohibited without the 
payment of just compensation rests exclusively on state court 
judges and their interpretations of common law nuisance doc-
trine. The legislature is to have no role whatsoever in evaluating 
property based harms. For constitutional purposes, the inherent 
limits on the use of property that define the parameters of what 
constitutes a taking would be controlled by state law. But they 
would be controlled exclusively by judge made state law.133 The 
same judges who were constitutionally incapable of balancing 
claims for religious exemption against the public interest under 
United State Supreme Court supervision have the unrestricted 
ability to balance private rights of property against the public 
good in setting out the parameters of takings decisions. Again, 
the irony could not be more awkward, since few common law 
areas are as explicitly grounded on policy based balancing as is 
nuisance law.134 
When religious freedom was the right at issue, concerns 
about balancing imponderables and value based decisions led the 
Court in Smith to drastically minimize the protection provided by 
the Free Exercise Clause to religious minorities. By deliberately 
directing claims for religious exemptions from laws of general ap-
plicability to the legislative arena, the Court could not help but 
recognize that legislators would be confronted with the same 
kind of value based, balancing problems that the judiciary had 
experienced in deciding free exercise cases. The task could not 
132. Id. at 2899 (noting that if "the legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justifica-
tion ... for departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be 
compensated" was a sufficient basis for negating the just compensation requirement, "de-
parture would virtually always be allowed"}. 
133. I d. at 2899-2902. In contrast to Justice Scalia's contention that only common law 
nuisance principles will be recognized by the Court as establishing the kind of harm pre-
vention regulations that might justify rendering property entirely valueless, Justice Ken-
nedy, in his concurring opinion, explicitly recognized that the legislature also has a role in 
identifying unacceptably harmful uses of property. Id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
134. See, e.g., Florida Rock Industries Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1565 n.10 
(Fed. Cir. 1994} (explaining that "(a] nuisance defense, by definition, incorporates a de-
gree of balancing."); Edward Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fundamental Assump-
tions, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1299 (1977). 
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be avoided, but a commitment to judicial restraint required that 
the job be assigned to the legislature rather than the judiciary 
even if that divestiture of judicial responsibility resulted in a sig-
nificant substantive curtailment of the scope of free exercise 
rights.135 If property rights and personal liberty rights such as 
religious freedom are to receive comparable constitutional pro-
tection, then property rights also cannot be shielded against 
majoritarian insensitivity by standards of review that are depen-
dent on value based judicial balancing. Like religious minorities, 
property owners must tum to the legislature to preform the bal-
ancing of interests that the protection of their rights requires. 
Judicial restraint concerns about subjective balancing were 
similarly ignored in another recent takings decision, Dolan v. 
City of Tigard.I36 Dolan scrutinized municipal demands for pub-
lic easements and land dedications that are commonly imposed 
on property owners as a condition to the city's granting them the 
permits they need to develop their property. Cities argue that 
the easements and dedications they seek are necessary to either 
mitigate, or compensate the community for, the externalities in-
creased development creates. Property owners, in tum, typically 
protest that municipal demands far exceed any burdens their 
proposed development could impose on the public. The owners 
in Dolan sought protection against various conditional require-
ments of this kind under the Takings Clause.137 
The Court's response to the landowner's claims in Dolan 
was to require judges to balance the externalities caused by de-
velopments against municipal dedication demands. In explaining 
the "rough proportionality" standard of review the Takings 
Clause required, the Court explained, "No precise mathematical 
calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of indi-
vidualized determination that the required dedication is related 
both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed develop-
ment."IJs If this proportionality analysis is intended to be ap-
plied with any degree of rigor, however, it is difficult to imagine a 
test that would more directly involve the courts in continuous, 
value based balancing of public and private interests. 
If a new subdivision results in the construction of 1000 new 
homes in a community, for example, the federal courts will now 
135. See Smith, 494 U.S.872, 890 (1990) (recognizing that "leaving accommodation to 
the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are 
not widely engaged in"). 
136. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). 
137. Id. at 2313-17; id. at 2324-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
138. Id. at 2319-20. 
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have the responsibility of estimating the environmental, social, 
and economic consequences of the project, and, even more prob-
lematically, will also have to determine what would constitute 
fair mitigation and compensation for the impact of the develop-
ment on the existing community. Unless previously undisclosed 
language in the Constitution provides courts information about 
the appropriate size, nature and location of parks, schools, trans-
portation arteries, open space, pollution controls and other pub-
lic goods that service communities, judges applying Dolan's 
proportionality test are going to be repeatedly using their own or 
someone's policy judgments and values in determining whether 
or not a taking has occurred. By comparison, religious minori-
ties, after Smith, can only wonder why judges competent enough 
to apply the Dolan test cannot similarly decide whether the bur-
den a law of general applicability imposes on an individual's reli-
gious practice is even "roughly proportional" to the meager 
benefits society may receive by insisting that a challenged law be 
enforced against religious dissenters without exception. 
The two remaining principles of judicial restraint, a respect 
for federalism and local control, and a preference for decision-
making by accountable elected representatives rather than ap-
pointed judges, also suggest that current takings clause doctrine 
is at least as activist, if not more so, than the case law implement-
ing many personal liberty rights. Land use regulation is an intrin-
sically local and state concern.B9 Moreover, public policy 
regarding the kinds of dedication requirements imposed on land-
owners and developers will necessarily vary by state and locality. 
A state that stringently limits local taxation, as California does 
after the passage of Proposition 13,140 may develop an entirely 
different regulatory framework for the development of property 
139. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that "zoning is a complex and important function 
of the State," perhaps "the most essential function performed by local government," and 
that, accordingly, "deference should be given to governmental judgments concerning 
proper land-use allocation"); Midkiffv. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 808-09 (9th Cir. 1983) (Fergu-
son, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[i]ssues concerning land use within a state" are part of 
the basic responsibilities of state governments in a federalist system because they "de-
pend on facts and circumstances that will vary from state to state"). 
140. See generally Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992). Oregon is another 
example. See generally Oregon Law Institute, Oregon Local Government Law 12-19-12-
31 (Oregon Law Institute, 1993) (describing the provisions of Measure 5, a constitutional 
amendment limiting property tax rates approved in 1990); Dolan v. Tigard, 317 Or. 110, 
129, 854 P.2d 437, 448 (1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (Peterson J., dissenting) (not-
ing that "The temptation, particularly in times of limited tax revenues, is to place the 
primary burden for funding projects on the shoulders of those whose private property 
happens to be in the neighborhood of the proposed projects ... "). 
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than will a state with a different tax structure. The Dolan deci-
sion itself described the rich diversity among the states regarding 
the legal treatment of dedication conditions.141 Yet without even 
an acknowledgement of federalism concerns, the Court imposed 
a nationally uniform standard on every state and locality in the 
country. 
Recent takings cases are similarly inconsistent with a basic 
commitment to political and legislative responsibility. Justice 
Kennedy's concurrence in Lucas demonstrates the narrow rigid-
ity of the majority's holding that only judges can be trusted to 
establish the background principles on which property rights are 
to be grounded. "The common law of nuisance is too narrow a 
confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex and 
interdependent society," Kennedy explained. "The State should 
not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in re-
sponse to changing conditions .... "142 Certainly, the same con-
cerns for legislative primacy that are urged as the basis for 
restricting the scope of personal liberty rights would support a 
broader role for the legislature in identifying harmful uses of 
property that can be prohibited without the payment of compen-
sation than the Court was willing to recognize in Lucas. Once 
again, equalizing the treatment of personal liberty and property 
rights by restricting both under the rubric of judicial restraint 
should result in a curtailment of the constitutional protection 
provided private property. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this essay is not to argue that the current 
protection of property provided by the Takings Clause is too gen-
erous or expansive. Obviously, despite the expansion of takings 
doctrine in recent cases, government conduct and regulations 
may still substantially interfere with uses of property and result 
in significant losses to property owners that need not be compen-
sated under current constitutional standards. It is equally obvi-
ous, however, that recent Takings Clause decisions may 
significantly interfere with the ability of government to further 
important public policy goals, particularly with regard to environ-
mental legislation. The appropriate balance to be drawn be-
tween publics needs and private property rights is a subject 
worthy of careful discussion, but it must be the focus of some 
other article, not this one. 
141. See Dolan, 114 S. a. at 2318-2319. 
142. Lucas, 112 S. a. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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The thesis of this article is simply that property rights are not 
the poor, neglected second cousins of personal liberty rights. In 
relative terms, in a variety of circumstances, property receives 
favorable, or at least roughly equivalent, treatment in compari-
son to the protection provided personal liberty rights such as 
freedom of religion, freedom of speech, equal protection rights 
or procedural due process. Any attempt to demand that the 
rules, standards and principles of interpretation that are applied 
to personal liberty rights must be enforced with equal, although 
thoughtless, rigor when takings cases are decided is at least as 
likely to result in the undermining of property right guarantees as 
it is to significantly increase the constitutional protection of prop-
erty. Indeed, the direction of the case law seems to clearly favor 
property as opposed to personal liberty and equality interests. 
Recent cases such as Lucas and Dolan extend the rigor and scope 
of Takings Clause doctrine while cases such as Casey and Smith, 
for example, directly reduce the protection provided abortion 
rights and freedom of religion. The day will arrive shortly, if it is 
not already here, when advocates of personal liberty rights will 
be demanding the same level of constitutional protection for 
those interests as is currently provided property. 
Both arguments, however, miss an essential point about the 
nature of rights. The range of interests recognized and protected 
as rights by the constitutional case law is too broad and the na-
ture of those interests is too varied for rights to be protected 
under any one set of universal principles. Doctrinal analogies 
are helpful if they are used as a basis for evaluation and discus-
sion. They can assist courts and attorneys in understanding and 
explaining why various rights are defined in certain ways and are 
reviewed under particular standards. Taken as a justification for 
determining constitutional doctrine without further inquiry and 
discussion, however, analogies among rights imply a false com-
monality of what the Constitution protects. More critically, they 
substitute rhetoric for analysis and conclusions for argument. 
Justice Rehnquist may or may not have been correct, in Do-
lan, in extending unconstitutional conditions doctrine to protect 
property owners against arguably unfair dedication demands im-
posed upon them by land use regulators. He certainly cannot 
justify that conclusion, however, by arguing that the Takings 
Clause is as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First and 
Fourth Amendments. The characteristics of property as a right 
that justify the distinct treatment it receives with regard to so 
many doctrinal rules requires more of an explanation than this 
54 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 13:7 
bare assertion. Ultimately, the only truly universal principle that 
applies to all constitutional rights is the need to define and de-
fend the protection provided the right in its own terms. 
